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1. Production and finance
by
T.V.S. R a m a m o h a n  R a o  *
FINANCIAL CHOICES OF THE 
AS ORGANIZATIONAL
The idea that the output and financial decisions of the firm may be 
interrelated is not new or novel. It has always been acknowledged that 
money capital is needed to finance the acquisition of fixed assets as well as 
the purchase of other factors of production utilized in the manufacture of 
a given volume of output The time lag between production and sales re­
ceipts will generate some inventories and other working capital require­
ments as well. See, for instance, Turnovsky (1970, pp. 1062 ff) and Vickers 
(1968; 1978, pp. 42ff; 1987, pp. 26ff). On the supply side, the nature of 
the product market and the implicit profit generating potential limits the 
quantum of finances available to the firm. Conversely, the availability and 
the costs of finance (considered in conjunction with the perceptions of the 
managers regarding the risk involved in using alternative financial instru­
ments) can define the extent to which the firm can capitalize on profitable 
market opportunities. In general, the product market environment deter­
mines the financial decisions and conversely. Some implications of this 
interdependence, for the theory of finance, have been outlined in Mclnnes 
and Carleton (1982).
Recently, Williamson (1986; 1988a; 1988b, pp. 567ff) and Holstrom 
and Tirole (1989) reconsidered the financial choices of the firm in an 
organizational context. In particular, debt and equity have been looked 
upon as alternative organizational mechanisms for financing the investment 
and production of the firm. This approach suggests a consideration of the
*  Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, U.P. (India).
1 One of the earliest examples is Gurley and Shaw (1960). See especially the model 
developed by Enthoven in the appendix.
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behavioral constraints, imposed on the management, by a specific financial 
mix in addition to the costs of financing. For instance, debt financing 
involves not only a fixed market interest rate but also a first charge for the 
repayment of principal in case of default or bankruptcy. On the other hand, 
increased equity participation will mean a greater scrutiny of the decisions 
of the firm by outside shareholders. The threat of takeover and the risks 
associated with the loss of control define the boundaries within which debt 
and equity participation will be sought by the management in finalizing its 
investment and production decisions. See also DeAlessi and Fische (1987) 
where they argued that the debt equity ratio will be the same as that of 
nonspecific to specific assets.
Stafford and Vaughan (1979, p. 17) as well as Grossman and Hart 
(1982) pointed out that only value maximizing firms tend to make efficient 
choices of production as well as financial mix. As such, the alternative 
governance structures of the firm, to the extent they reduce the motivation 
for profit maximization, are likely to lead to inefficiencies of various kinds. 
However, it appears that no systematic attempt has been made to examine 
the efficiency effects of discretionary managerial behavior on the interrela­
tionship between the production and financial choices of the management.
Rao (1989) examined the economic efficiency of mixed organizational 
forms and nonprice decisions of the firm in a neoclassical framework. In 
particular, it was pointed out that the welfare effects can be traced to 
changes in the (a) cost curves, (b) demand curves, and (c) managerial 
motivations. The sources and the extent of changes in welfare have been 
examined by introducing the concepts of internal and external pressure. 
Firstly, note that competitive product markets eliminate profits in the long 
run and consequently generate internal pressure on the management to 
keep the costs of production at the lowest possible level. This would 
probably be true even in the choice of organizational forms. However, it 
cannot be claimed that imperfect product markets will be necessarily, 
characterized by a lack of internal pressure. Stated differently, internal 
pressure or the lack of it will be fundamentally related to ownership rights 
and incentive mechanisms within organizations rather than the market 
structure itself. Secondly, there have been many situations in which the 
nonprice and other decision processes of the firm had an influence on the 
market demand for the firm. This difference from the competitive market 
assumptions can be viewed as the fundamental specification of the lack 
of external pressure. The emergence of the lack of internal and/or external 
pressure can be shown to reduce social welfare.
The primary purpose of the present study is to show that this approach
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is valid even in the context of the financial decisions of the firm. Section II 
will outline the essential aspects of the problem specification. A simple 
model will be developed in Section III to demonstrate the validity of 
the above stated results. Section IV will be devoted to other important 
extensions. Section V brings together certain unresolved research issues.
2. Essential Aspects of Specification
In the initial stages the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, given 
its postulated perfect capital market assumptions, justified the dichotomiza- 
tion of the production and financial decisions of the firm. See, for instance, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 333) and Vickers (1987). Taken as a norma­
tive theory it has the virtue of indicating that if the product and capital 
markets are competitive and the firms pursue the objective of maximizing 
the market value of the firm (present discounted value of cashflows) the 
management will choose efficient levels of factors of production, outputs, 
and financial mix. In practice, the absence of competitive markets raises 
doubts about the independence of the output and financial decisions as well 
as their economic efficiency. Further,, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
pointed out, the existence of positive and differential costs associated with 
bankruptcy and other financial instruments invalidates this theory.
Several attempts have been made in the past to examine the issue of 
interdependence and its economic implications. The following major strands 
of thought can be identified.
Mclnnes and Carleton (1982, p. 959) considered the possibility that 
financial markets can fully and unambiguously evaluate the position of the 
output markets and the implications of different methods of financing for 
the cost of producing a given output on the market. If such is the case the 
output and financial decisions can be considered to be independent of one 
another and the economic efficiency of one set of decisions implies that of 
the other. However, in practice, the information flows cannot be costless 
and so efficient.
On occasions it was pointed out that the financial availability con­
straint is the most important aspect of the interaction. Vickers (1978, pp. 
42ff; and 1987, pp. 73ff), for instance, argued that for a given volume of 
output the firms would economize on those factors of production which 
require more money and/or costly financing. Mclnnes and Carleton (1982), 
on the other hand, suggested the possibility that output will be reduced in 
such a way that the financial constraint is binding. The net effect of the
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inelasticity of the supply of finances depends upon the elasticity of substitu­
tion between the factors of production.
Given any one source of finances, such as retained earnings, the firm 
may experience a limit on the supply of finances. However, given the 
innumerable financial innovations and sources of funds, the cost of finances 
rather than the availability is likely to be more limiting. Most of the studies 
adopt this viewpoint. In general, debt servicing involves fixed interest obli­
gations. On the other hand, equity participation, even when a minimum 
dividend payment rate is stipulated, does not make the cost of financing 
equally rigid. However, as Feldstein et al. (1979) and others argued, the 
costs of finance to the firm, for providing a given volume of output, 
depends on both the debt equity ratio as well as the dividend payout ratio. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Dotan and Ravid (1985, p. 515) pointed 
out that the future cashflows of the firm depend on the product market as 
well as the financial arrangements so that they tend to be more closely 
related over time.
While equity participation from outside (i.e., individuals not related 
to the management) may reduce the cost of financing investments and the 
production of a given volume of output it tends to generate a risk to the 
management in the form of a takeover threat. It would therefore be essen­
tial to examine the managerial responses to risk in any appraisal of the 
efficiency of the financial arrangements. Some general theoretical formula­
tions are available in Aiginger (1987). The various options and some empiri­
cal tests in the financial market context have been reported in Grabowski 
and Muller (1972), Muller (1986, pp. 148ff), and Contini (1989). Further, 
Grossman and Hart (1982, pp. 108ff) pointed out that the firm’s financial 
structure determines the efficiency of bankruptcy as a source of discipline 
of the management. In particular, the greater the debt equity ratio the more 
conscious the management will be of the need to generate adequate profits 
(because managers lose the perquisites of their position when the firm goes 
bankrupt).
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 305) as well as Grossman and Hart 
(1982) argued that the management may make an attempt to reduce the 
impact of external shareholding by share ownership, in varying degrees, 
among themselves. For, in general, the greater the fraction of shares (espe­
cially voting rights) owned by the management the less the chance of a 
successful takeover and greater the managerial discretion. See also Stulz 
(1988, p. 26). It appears from the evidence presented in Brickley et al. 
(1988) that even financial institutions, who own shares and are not under
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the influence of management, can only have a very limited effect on the 
behavior of the management.
In the extreme case, the management may even design and implement 
complex organizational structures in such a way that outsiders can be effec­
tively kept away (i.e., ownership does not result in any effective control) 
and the interaction between the real and financial decisions minimized. 
Dann and DeAngelo (1988, p. 15) provided some evidence in this context. 
In general, the management cannot be expected to have such a high degree 
of control.
Consider the influence of finance on the demand curve for the firm. 
This can take several manifestations. Firsdy, there will be a goodwill cost 
and shift to the left of the demand curve for the firm’s products whenever 
there is a quantitative financial constraint limiting the ability of the firm 
to produce, hold inventory or extend credit to the retail outlets. Secondly, 
an increase in the costs of obtaining funds from any source of financing 
can limit the ability of the firm to attract new customers or maintaining the 
existing level of demand. Thirdly, Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 341) 
gave an example of the manufacturers of sophisticated computer equipment 
where the market demand crucially depends upon the ability of the firm 
to maintain equipment as well as provide the requisite hardware and 
software development. It may be argued that while a favorable financial 
position improves the market position of such a firm an increase in liquidity 
problems tend to reduce it.
In sum, the effect of financial decisions on social welfare can be 
through one or more of the following factors:
(a) a quantitative constraint on the supply of financial resources,
(b) effect of changes in the financial mix on the cost of finances,
(c) the degree to which the management can control voting rights by 
its own equity participation and/or reduce internal pressure to maximize 
profits,
(d) the attitudes of the management towards residual financial risk,
and t
(e) the extent of lack of external pressure and the management’s
influence on the demand.
These aspects and their welfare implications will be considered in the 
sequel.
758 T.V.S. RAMAMOHAN RAO
3. The Basic Model2
Consider the case of a firm which utilizes two resources, x1 =  fixed 
factor, and x2 =  variable factor, to produce an output Y. Let the demand 
curve for the product of the firm be represented by
P =  P 0 0 ;  p x =  dp/dY <  0
The management of the firm has a choice of the output level Y as well.
The cost of purchasing the resources xu x2 needs to be financed. 
Assume that the firm either borrows an amount B (debt) or utilizes internal­
ly generated sources 3 such as retained earnings (7). Then it is obvious that
Pi * i  +  P2x2 =  B +  I (1)
must be satisfied. Let the market rate of interest on debt be r (B); ri >  0. 
Assume that the management does not impute any cost to the use of internal 
financial sources. The cost of producing output Y can now be written as
C (Y) = / > ! * ,  +  p2 x2 +  Br (B) (2)
This approach was basically suggested by Vickers (1978, pp. 10 ff; 1987, 
pp. 28 ff).
For purposes of the analysis of the present section social welfare will 
be defined as the total utility gain to the consumers of the products of the 
firm less the costs of production. That is,
W (Y) — total social welfare
=  p (y )d y ~ C (Y )
Conceptually, the net additional to the welfare of the society from the 
production of a unit of output is the highest if the factors of production are 
chosen, for given input prices, so as to minimize the cost of production. In 
general, this is one of the first requirements of welfare maximization.
Throughout the present study a static modelling framework will be adopted and the 
interaction of the investment and financial decisions will be ignored. However, some extensions 
are possible along the lines of Koutsoyannis (1987), Loon (1983) and Odagiri (1981).
Depreciation reserves, reserves and surpluses, and provisions for taxes will also have to 
be taken into account. Each of these sources of funds, to the extent they are meant to fulfill a 
specific need may be at best partially substitutable.
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Given this framework, welfare implications of managerial choices can 
be ascertained by examining (a) the input choices for a given level of 
output, as well as (b) the choice of the level of output. It is well known 
that the allocative inefficiency in the actual choice of Y by the firm is a 
result of the product market imperfection and the consequent inability of 
the firm to convert consumer utility into profit. This aspect of the specifica­
tion need not be pursued any further. The input choices for a given Y 
generate the essential welfare changes in the organizational context. For, 
originating from Williamson (1964, 1970), it was argued that in imperfect 
product markets, there is a possibility that the managers of the firms will 
be choosing input combinations for a given Y which can result in higher 
cost. This will be the result whenever the management has an explicit 
preference for the use of any one of the factors of production beyond that 
which is implied by its contribution to cost alone. The excessive cost results 
in a welfare loss which will be designated as managerial inefficiency. The 
present study focuses on this aspect alone.
One result is immediately obvious. Let the management of the firm 
be motivated to maximize profits. Then, for any given Y, the input choices 
must be such as to minimize the cost of production of Y so long as 
p =  p(Y) and not a function of the input choices. Hence, there will be no 
managerial inefficiency in such an environment.
Within the framework of the present model the management is free 
to choose x, alone. For, given the production function and the financial 
constraint represented by equation (1) all other inputs are determined if jq 
is known. The analysis can therefore be restricted to a consideration of the 
efficient choice of xl and its interaction with the financial variables.
To outline the basic interaction between the real and financial variables 
consider the case where the firm maximizes profits. Then, for a given Y, x, 
and x2 will be chosen to minimize C (Y). If I is assumed to be given 
exogenously 4, then
B =  p 1x1 +  P2X2 ~  1
Further, by the nature of the neoclassical production function, it follows 
that
x2 — x2 (Y, Xj)
4 The distribution of profits between retentions and other uses cannot be determined only 
by the profit-making criterion. Consideration of the growth of firms, if it is taken as an 
alternative to profit maximization, may determine the optimal I. Hence, in the rest of the 
analysis of this section / will be taken to be exogenous.
760 T.V.S. RAMAMOHAN RAO
Consequently, the choice of xx satisfies the equation
[Pi +  Pi (dx2/dxx)] [1 +  (1 +  e)r(B)]  =  0 (3)
where e =  Brx (B)/r (B) is the elasticity of the interest rate w.r. to B.
Observe that if r (B ) =  r, independent of B, i.e., the capital markets are
competitive, then e =  0 and the choice of xx will satisfy the equation
Pi +  p2 (dx2/dxx) =  0
since (1 +  r) is then independent of the choice of xx. That is, it will be 
such as to minimize
C (Y) =  pi xx +  p2 x2
without any interaction with the financial variables. This, in essence, is the 
Modigliani and Miller theorem. In the more general case where e >  0 it 
can be readily verified that5
xx =  Xi (e) ;  d x jd e  <  0.
The following example is sufficiently illustrative. Let the production 
function be
Y =  / ( x 1; x2) =  (Xi x2)1/2
Then the x2 requirement along an isoquant is given by
x2 =  Y2/x,
and the xx choice itself satisfies the equation
Pi ~  P2 0P2/Xi) — [pi — p2 {Y^/x^)] r {B) (1 +  e ) (3a)
It should be obvious that when 6 =  0, p x =  p2 (Y2/xx). However, 
[Pi ~ p 2 ( Y2/xj)] is positive in the neighborhood of this xi since costs are no
One turther observation is in order. The x j ( e ) so defined depends on the parametric 
choice of I. As such it is possible to conceptualize a choice of I to maximize n. The results of 
this section can be taken to be derived from such an opt'mal I. However, it is somewhat 
doubtful if the I choice is motivated by these considerations. Even if other organizational 
goals predominate the rest of the analysis is valid for the corresponding optimal choice of I. 
The economic efficiency of the choice of I can also be examined in a similar framework. Some 
basic conceptual controversies arising in such a context have been outlined in detail in Rao
(1989).
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Fie*. 1
longer minimum. Hence, given that 6 >  0 the choice of x, as can be veri­
fied from Fig. 1, would be such that xl decreases as e  increases. For, the 
imperfection in the capital market makes the firm choose M instead of C. It 
is also obvious that the welfare maximizing as well as profit maximizing 
choices of output will be lower as a result of the capital market imperfec­
tion. However, the only inefficiency, in the context of the neoclassical 
welfare paradigm, is the allocative inefficiency in the choice of the output 
level Y.
One further aspect needs to be considered. On occasions the firm may 
provide credit to its customers in the process of conducting sales. Suppose 
this is proportional to Yp(Y). If B is the source of finances the firm 
would still choose Xj to minimize costs for a given output but the Y itself 
would be reduced 6. This contributes to allocative inefficiency. The models 
of Herendeen (1975), Vickers (1978), and Hite (1979) considered this 
aspect in some detail.
Depending on the profitability of production, which is determined by 
the nature of the market demand curve, there may be a limit on the amount 
of B which the firm can borrow. Let M be such a limit. Then the firm will
6 This can be contested. For, after all, the possibility of obtaining credit from the firm 
may shift its demand curve to the right. The gains to the consumers from this may be difficult 
to determine a priori.
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Fig . 2
reduce the output from P to M in Fig. 2 without affecting the cost minimiz­
ing choice of inputs to produce Y2. That is, quantitative financial constraints 
of this nature add to the allocative inefficiency alone 7.
Borrowing from external sources in an imperfect capital market may 
(a) increase cost, (b) create an uncertainty regarding the availability of 
adequate finances, and/or (c) a possibility that profits are reduced to a point 
where the firm cannot even meet the fixed interest obligations 8. In such a 
case the management may show a preference against increases in B. This is 
very well documented in the context of the choice of xv See, for instance, 
DeAlessi and Fische (1987). A lack of internal pressure is indicated. Let the 
preferences of the management be represented by
u (n, B); u1 >  0, u2 <  0
Consider the management’s choice of x1 for a given Y in such a context. 
Clearly, it would satisfy the equation
7 In Rao (1989) it was pointed out that some constraints on the management of the firm 
are imposed from the outside; either from the market or the motivations of workers, consumers 
etc. The other type of constraints are self imposed and are a result of managerial motivations. 
The first kind of constraints can only contribute to allocative inefficiency. Only the latter can 
be said to generate managerial inefficiency through the implied cost changes.
8 Much of the literature on the discretionary managerial behavior emerges from Berle and 
Means (1968). Williamson’s work (1964, 1970) had a fundamental bearing on most of the 
subsequent developments.
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(dn/dxj) — — u2 {dB/d x/)lul >  0
Consequently, there is an increase in the cost of production and a reduction 
in welfare (especially consumer surplus) which can be' designated as mana­
gerial inefficiency.
Recall that the lenders of the firm may feel that the management 
would be efficient and pursues profit maximization and/or growth in 
output9 given the fixed interest payments obligations on the financial 
resources of the firm. There is a possibility that the firm would derive a 
market advantage as a result of the consumer reaction. Consequently, there 
can be a lack of external pressure. That is, the demand curve will become
P = P ( Y ,  B)- dp/dB >  0
It can be shown that there will be an additional welfare loss even when the 
management maximizes n. For, the choice of x, does not minimize the cost 
of producing a given Y any longer. In particular, the choice of xY would be 
such that
Pi — -  p2 {dx2/dx/) +  [— r (1 +  e ) +  {dp/dB)] {d B '/d x/) (6)
Since dp/d B >  0 the expression on the right hand side of this equation is 
greater than that in (3a). It can therefore be inferred that this adds to the 
managerial inefficiency in the form of a further reduction in the consumer 
surplus.
When there is a limit on the supply of outside finances, either market 
induced or self imposed due to managerial preferences, it is necessary to 
reconsider the choice of I since it can no longer be considered as parametric. 
Recall that
C  (Y ) =  p i  X j +  p 2 x2 +  Br (B)
where
pj x1 +  p2 x2 =  13 +  I
Given Y and the choice of x1( both B and I  would be determined by the 
constraint. Hence, all aspects of the foregoing analysis carry over even if B 
is taken as parametric and I  as the decision variable.
9 Rao (1989) noted that if growth is along this dimension there will be no lack of internal 
pressure to minimize costs of production for a given Y. There will be a cost increase if this is 
replaced by a preference for the growth in X\. These two different approaches to the growth of 
the firm are represented in Baumol (1959) and Penrose (1959) respectively.
764 T.V.S. RAMAMOHAN RAO
It is evident from this analysis that the interaction between the real 
and financial variables, resulting from the capital market imperfection, gener­
ates a welfare loss over and above the allocative inefficiency if there is a 
lack of internal and/or external pressure.
4. Capital vs. Money Markets
It was assumed in the previous section that the firm obtains its fi­
nances by borrowing from the market at a predetermined interest rate to 
supplement the internally generated sources of funds. No distinction was 
made between the long term needs to finance capital formation and the 
short run working capital requirements. However, in practice, the amount 
of finances needed for these distinct requirements as well as the relative 
risks necessitate the use of alternative sources of finance and governance 
structures 10.
A single owner unit experiences a significant liability in case of default. 
A joint stock company would come into existence to spread the risks among 
the various shareholders. This would, however, entail at least partial owner­
ship and control (voting rights) by shareholders. It is necessary to examine 
the implications of this organizational choice for the interaction between the 
real and financial aspects and the consequent effects on the efficiency of 
production and financial decisions 11.
In this context the financial markets have two segments: (a) the 
market for ownership of assets (capital markets), and (b) the market for 
short term borrowing and lending (money market). Recent innovations 
made the financial instruments in both the markets rather extensive. But, 
for purposes of analytical clarity the issue of common stock will be consid­
An increase in the asset specificity may make the use of short term borrowing to 
finance such assets impractical, risky, and more expensive. Long term assets with a high degree 
of specificity will then be financed through the capital market. This is essentially the position 
of Williamson (1988a, 1988b) and DeAlessi and F ische (1987). Neither of these authors 
considered the impact of the changes in the motivations of the management on the optimal 
choice of the capital assets and the financial mix.
"  Williamson (1986) argued that common ownership and collective governance of 
specific capital assets may reduce the shareholder’s concern that asset values are dissipated if 
management is handed over to a few. Organizational economies may arise in the implementa­
tion of such governance structures for other reasons as well. Demsetz (1988, and elsewhere), 
detailed such considerations. Organization specific transaction costs can be subject to a variety 
of economies of scope. This argument and its implications will not be pursued further in this 
study.
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ered as the major instrument in capital markets. Borrowing (or bonding) 
and lending at a fixed market determined interest rate will be taken as the 
primary activity of the money m arket12.
The implications of capital market transactions for the cost of capital 
to the firm have been well documented. The shareholders obtain a short 
term dividend payment as well as capital gains in the long run when the 
share prices increase. In their portfolio choice, the shareholders would be 
willing to tradeoff short run dividend payments in favor of long term capital 
gains. Hence, even if there is a minimum dividend payout rate that must be 
paid it will be less than the market interest rate for long term borrowing. 
Dividend payments are generally not added to the cost of production for 
the firm since these capital market payments are a share of profits to the 
firm. Even if the obligatory minimum dividends are added as a cost 13 (since 
they may then be independent of the profit generated) the total cost of 
producing a given level of output would still be lower than what it would 
be if all the finances are obtained from the money market alone. This cost 
reduction, implicit in the use of the capital market, is as important as the 
sharing of risks while considering the interaction of the real and financial 
decisions in the theory of the firm.
The utilization of alternative financial arrangements will have impor­
tant implications for the governance of the firm. For, it was pointed out that 
the shareholders, as owners of the firm, would utilize their voting rights to 
make the management of the firm pursue their interest. In particular, if they 
are oriented toward long term capital gains instead of short term profits
12 Unfortunately such rigid distinctions cannot be made in any practical context. The 
difficulty is especially acute in the context of financial resources generated by the firm 
internally. For instance, depreciation reserves have the stated purpose of financing capital 
assets. However, there are many instances where the management of the firm may utilize these 
funds for short term working capital requirements. The extent of substitutability and its 
implications for efficient organization of the firm are somewhat nebulous. Detailed empirical 
information may be necessary before any formal theoretical structures can be developed.
13 Dividend payments will have to be treated in the same way as a bonus paid to the 
workers out of profits. They constitute basically a redistribution of profits and rents among 
fixed factors and specific assets of the firm. Traditional costing conventions may include these 
in costs. Then, from a welfare economics viewpoint an increase in dividend payments will 
reduce the welfare of the consumers of the final products of the firm. However, such a direct 
relationship of dividends to costs is not acceptable. See Wood (1971, p. 65). An increase in 
dividend payments reduces the availability of internal funds to finance capital assets as well as 
working capital and results in an increased borrowing from the market. This will indirectly 
increase the cost of production. Since the cost effect of increased borrowing is directly 
accounted for in the following analysis there will be no further indirect cost effects of increased 
dividend payments.
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there would be an overcapitalization and excessive growth of the firm. 
However, as Berle and Means (1968) remarked, the separation of owner­
ship from control may reduce the efficacy of the shareholders in enforcing 
their objectives on the management of the firm.
The alternative governance structures may result in rather diverse man­
agerial motivations as well. Firstly, it has been recognized that the diffused 
shareholding and the absence of commitments to pay for the finances at a 
fixed rate has a tendency to dilute the necessity to maximize profits and 
maintain efficiency of production. Secondly, to the extent that the manage­
ment’s ownership of the shares of the firm may be limited they do not value 
sharing of profits as much as obtaining perquisites and security of jobs 
which are not necessarily limited by profit maximization. In other words, an 
increase in the managerial control of firms results in a tradeoff of profits for 
other objectives 14.
The cost reduction and the consequent possibility of generating greater 
profit may itself be a source of discretionary managerial behavior. Referring 
to Fig. 3, adapted from Coase (1937), let ACm represent the average cost of
The conventional argument is that discretionary managerial behavior arises due to the 
separation of ownership from the management and the resulting loss of control by the 
shareholders. But in the present interpretation of organizational choice the urge, on the part of 
the management, to avoid the risks of external control is more dominant. In other words, risk 
aversion rather than the pursuit of other managerial objectives explains the lack of internal 
pressure.
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producing a given level of output when production is organized through 
market borrowing and AC( the average cost under the alternative of utilizing 
the capital market. The alternative governance structure is then beneficial 
between the points marked as i. For, assume that A is the volume of output 
produced. AC is the average cost if the market mode of borrowing is 
utilized. AB is the minimum possible average cost of production under the 
alternative governance structure, i.e., using the capital market in conjunction 
with borrowing. The positive difference BC in the cost is the primary 
motivation for the use of the capital market. The actual level of costs, which 
can be obtained for the given level of output, will generally exceed the 
minimum AB possible. For, as Williamson (1964, p. 11) pointed out, when 
the difference BC is small and survival is narrowly bounded, the manage­
ment would approximate B. The discretion available to the management 
would then be low. If, however, BC is large, the managers may not be 
forced to initiate efficient action until the actual B obtained approaches C. 
It can be argued that the management may channel discretionary profits to 
pursue other objectives.
In general, it can only be claimed that the objective of profit maximiza­
tion is diluted. However, empirical evidence on the original source of 
change as well as the exact nature of the change in the managerial motiva­
tions remains ambiguous. It is essential to recognize that the cost increases 
created by managerial choices and consequent welfare losses are at the apex 
of the analysis of the welfare changes brought about by nonprice competi­
tion and organizational decisions of the firm.
A formal analysis of the welfare effects of the interaction between the 
real and financial decisions of the firm can now be presented along conven­
tional lines. Let x\ be the stock of capital at the beginning of the time period 
and let additional investments bring it up to Xj during a given interval of 
time. It will be assumed that an amount S of common stock is outstanding. 
Let S represent the new issues of common stock (of par value unity and 
current market price p ) during time t 15 16. Then, the additional finances 
raised from the stock market can be denoted by p S and will be used ,
”  Turnovsky (1970, pp. 1065 ff) considered the possible differences that arise in the 
analysis due to the distinction between the book values and market value of equity in 
calculating the debt-equity ratios.
16 Very often, new stock is sold at par. In such a case p *  will have to be set equal to 1 in 
the rest of the analysis. No new insights are obtained. However, there would be a need to 
independently explain the changes in the market value of shares and the consequent capital 
gains to shareholders. This would be a requirement if shareholder’s preferences should be made 
a component of social welfare valuations. The model must then be respecified in a dynamic 
framework.
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along with accumulated reserves and surpluses, to finance new capital forma­
tion 17. That is,
P (Xj — Xj) =  p S +  R +  A (7)
where P is the market price of new capital goods, R, is the total accumu­
lated reserves and surpluses (including depreciation reserves), and A is the 
addition to R from current profit. Denote by p x the imputed user cost per 
unit of capital stock xt per unit of time. Then, the current cost of using xt 
in the production process can be represented by xl p 1. Consider the cost of 
purchasing the variable factor x2. Let p2 be the market price per unit of x2. 
Then, it will be postulated that the short term financial requirement is 
fulfilled by either internal sources or market borrowing. Let
p2x2 — B +  I (8)
where I is the part of current profits of the firm which are retained to 
finance working capital requirements. In its turn, I  is determined by the 
equation
u =  d ( S - \ - S ) - \ - I - \ - A  (9)
where d =  dividends per share of common stock.
As in the previous section it will be assumed that the production 
function of the firm is Y =  / (x,, x2). Further, following Vickers (1968, 
1978) it will be postulated that the total cost of production is
C (V) =  pi xl +  p2 x2 +  Br (B, p * S) (10)
where r (B, p * S) is the market interest rate on borrowing. For, as Vickers 
(1987, p. 61 and p. 33) argued “the higher the debt equity ratio, or the 
higher the degree of financial leverage at work in the firm, the greater will 
be the risk of exposure of both the' creditors, that is the debt holders, and 
the residual owners”. Hence, the firm will have to pay a higher rate of 
interest on its debt capital as the debt equity ratio increases 18.
The problem for the management is to choose xu B, d, I, S and A. 
However, they cannot choose all of these variables independently in view of
17 This specification makes a rather strong assumption that management does not utilize 
any long term borrowing to finance capital assets. To that extent market borrowing at fixed 
interest rates is a short term feature in the present analysis. Suitable modifications, by 
introducing the option of long term debt, do not appear to alter the results fundamentally.
18 Strictly speaking the total equity cannot be represented by p *S  alone. However, it can 
be shown that the following results are not qualitatively affected.
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the accounting relationships 19. The classical Lintner (1956) debate about 
the dividend policy being primary (exogenously given to the management) is 
a case in point.
It is therefore necessary to specify which of the variables will be 
actively chosen by the management while leaving the others as residual. 
There is no consensus in the literature about the appropriate choice. In 
general, any two of these variables can be specified as active decisions while 
the others are determined by the accounting identities. However, the results 
will not be fundamentally affected by the choice.
The following analytical procedure will be adopted in the rest of this 
section in order to present a consistent view of the decision making process. 
Firstly, consider the choice of the combination of the physical inputs xx and 
x2 along an isoquant. If xl is chosen, it follows from the specification of the 
production function that x2 =  x2 (Y, xx) will be fixed for a given Y. Xj will 
therefore be taken as one of the decision variables. Secondly, the manage­
ment will be assumed to confront a target dividend payout ratio which is 
set by the shareholders. That is, a takeover threat may be posed, even if it 
is not realized ex post, when the rate of dividend falls below this target. 
Risk averse managers can be taken to behave in such a way as to avoid all 
the private costs of potential takeover. The choice of d is therefore exoge­
nous 20. Thirdly, every reduction in the debt equity ratio implies a greater 
control of outside shareholders. The management would make an attempt 
to fix an optimal debt equity ratio keeping the financial requirements in 
perspective.
From an operational viewpoint these decisions can be considered as 
equivalent to a choice of xl and S. For, suppose both these quantities are 
fixed. Then, equation (7) implies that A is determined as a residual. The 
definition of costs of production in equation (10) suggests that equation 
(9) specifies the requirements of I. Finally, from equation (8), it can be 
deduced that
B =  p2x2 (Y, Xj) -  I
so that the amount of debt will also be determined. In sum, it can be stated
19 It should also be reiterated that nonprice and organizational decisions may neither have 
any implications for the costs of the firm nor do they necessarily get to be chosen on profit 
maximization considerations. These aspects have been extensively reviewed in Holstrom and 
Tirole (1989, especially section 4).
20 The literature on the primacy of dividend decisions is rather extensive. Relatively recent 
useful references are Hakannson (1982), Feldstein and Green (1983), and Easterbrook 
(1984).
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that x1 and S are the active decisions of the management and the others are 
residual choices.
There is a further requirement of specifying the managerial objectives 
to complete the analysis. Assume the existence of external pressure from 
the product markets on the management. Then, from a purely normative 
viewpoint it is necessary to consider the conditions under which cost 
minimizing choices would be made. The maximization of (a) either the 
static profit function, or (b) the market value of the firm (represented by 
the discounted present value of cashflows) will ensure the fulfillment of the 
internal pressure requirement. In practice, the management of the firm may 
pursue other objectives either as a response to the risk of loss of control 
and/or other discretionary objectives arising from the private interests of 
the management. The normative choices, implicit in the profit maximization 
postulate, will be considered initially so that the identification of the sources 
of inefficiency can proceed systematically.
The allocative inefficiency in the choice of Y resulting from the prod­
uct market imperfection is well known. However, the managerial choices 
of inputs x, and the financial arrangements represented by the decision 
regarding S can result in a cost increase, over and above the minimum 
possible, and add to the inefficiency of the firm. To emphasize this aspect 
of the specification it may first be noted that if the management experiences 
external pressure and pursues the objective of maximizing profits then it 
will minimize costs of every given level of output Y in its choice of physical 
inputs and other financial variables. With this in perspective consider the 
choice of Xj and S, for a given Y, so as to minimize
C =  cost of conducting sales of Y units of output
=  Pi Xj +  p2 x2 O', +  Br (B, p * S )
where B can be determined implicitly from the equation
B [1 -  r (B, p* 5)] =  - Y p  (Y) +  p l xl +  P  (xt -  xj) +
+  2p2x2 (Y, x j  +  d (S +  S*) -  p* S -  R (11)
Viewing B as a function of x t and p* S it can be verified from equation (11) 
that
dB/dxl — [p1 +  P +  2 (dx2/dxl)]/[l -  r (  1 +  6 )], and
dB/dp* S =  [(d/p) +  Br2 -  1]/[1 -  r ( l  +  e )] ( 12)
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Consequently, the choice of x t and S would be such as to satisfy the 
equations
[Pi +  P2 (dxjdx/)] [1 +  r (1 +  6 )] =  (?! r- P) r (1 +  e  ), and
Br2 =  r ( l  +  6 ) [ 1  -  (d/p*)] (13)
Let the capital market be competitive. That is, r (B, p" S) — r (a 
constant) and 6 = 0 .  Further, the price P of capital goods can be taken to 
be the present discounted value of p v That is, P =  (1 +  r) p jr .  Hence, 
the first part of equation (13) reduces to
Pi +  Pi (dx2/dxx) =  Pi (1 +  2r)
In general, since the expression on tbe right hand side is positive, a construc­
tion similar to Fig. 1 will imply that there will be a tendency on the part of 
the management to utilize a larger capital stock compared to xlm but less 
than xk . This result holds though cost minimization is being pursued. To an 
extent this result is a consequence of the cost reduction implicit in the use of 
the capital market for fixed asset financing since the risk of takeover and 
related managerial disutilities are not taken into account21. However, in the 
general case when 6 >  0 it can be verified that
Xj =  x1 ( e ) ;  d x jd e  <  0
Consider the choice of the relative proportions between debt and 
equity. If 5 increases by one unit, there is an increase in interest payments 
by an amount Br2p*. However, there is a concomitant reduction in the 
amount of market borrowings B as specified in equation (12). Therefore, 
the interest payments will be reduced by an amount
rp (1 +  e )  [1 -  (d/p*)]
These two quantities must be equal if the debt equity ratio is optim al22. 
This is the second part o f 23 *25equation (13).
21 The changes in the choice of Y associated with specific financial variables, as outlined 
in Holstrom and Tirole (1989, p. 103), refer mostly to allocative inefficiency concepts alone. 
For, as evident from the present analysis, cost minimization for a given Y is still being pursued 
when both external and internal pressures prevail.
22 There are two other contrasting viewpoints regarding the determination of the optimal 
debt equity ratio. One of these is the viewpoint of DeAlessi and F ische (1987) mentioned 
earlier. The other is that there is an institutionally determined leverage which is binding and
that this homemade leverage is not acceptable. It is difficult to comment further on these
within the limits of the present model.
25 Though, in general, it is obvious that B/p *S  and consequently the debt equity ratio is a
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The inelasticity in the supply of finances from any particular source 
cannot have the same effect in the generalized model as it was in the 
previous section. For, the degree of substitutability between the short term 
and long term sources of funds, their relative costs, and relative risks will 
determine the ultimate outcome. Managerial choices may entail certain cost 
increases and corresponding welfare losses. This aspect of the problem has 
always been controversial in the literature on the interrelationship between 
the real and financial variables.
Suppose the interest rate on debt is positively related to the amount of 
borrowing. Then, the availability of less expensive alternatives may even 
induce the management to shift away from the use of this market source 
even at the risk of some loss of control. Suppose the lack of internal 
pressure can be concretely represented in the form of a preference function
u (n, B); u1 >  0, u2 <  0
The choice of x1 by the management, would now take the form
dn/dxl =  -  2 («2/« i)  \P\ +  P2 (dx2/dxl)]/[l -  r (1 +  e )]  >  0 (14)
This would imply an increase in the cost of production so that some mana­
gerial inefficiency will be apparent in addition to the allocative inefficiency 
in the choice of Y.
The largeness of the size of the firm, which is a result of the diversity 
of financing available to it, may enable it to obtain certain economies of 
scope, diversify into both vertically and horizontally related activities and 
generate certain market advantages for itself. Even the possibility that it 
would have better relationships with both sundry debtors and sundry credi­
tors may enable it to expand its market and/or create certain preemptive 
competitive barriers both to other incumbent firms in the product market as
function of x x and x2 it is not possible to say that the debt equity ratio should be equal to 
x 1/ x2 without further assumptions. The transaction cost theories claim this impressionistically 
and have yet to establish this result concretely. The best argument that can be put forward on 
the present evidence is the following. Though the direct costs of equity financing are low the 
transaction costs are high. This can be explained by noting that (a) the costs of flotation of 
common stock as well as retiring it, (b) the costs associated with ownership and eventual 
capital gains which need to be paid to outside shareholders if they choose to redeem the stock, 
and (c) the managerial costs of risk of loss of control are all high and significant in comparison 
to the relatively low transaction costs of debt financing. Hence, (a) the relatively much larger 
frequency of short term transactions, (b) the inability to liquidate fixed assets at short notice, 
as well as (c) the ownership rights associated with equity financing make debt the more 
suitable instrument for short term nonspecific assets and equity financing suitable for specific 
assets of a long term nature. See also DeAlessi and F ische (1987).
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well as to potential entrants. This has generally been designated as the lack 
of external pressure. As outlined earlier, this leads to an additional welfare 
loss even if the management continues to maximize n. The primary reason 
for this is that cost minimization in the decision making process does not 
hold any longer. A formal verification of this statement consists in noting 
that the x1 choice would be such that
[pi +  P2 (dx2/dxl)] [1 +  r (1 +  e )]
=  (py -  P) r (1 +  e )  +  7  (dp/B) (dB/dx,) (15)
The expression on the right hand side is greater than that in the first part of 
equation (13) since
p = p { Y ,  B); dp/dB >  0.
It is clear from this presentation that managerial inefficiency may be a result 
of the lack of internal and/or external pressure. That is, in general, these 
effects are additive 24.
In sum, it can be concluded that cost minimization, for a given output 
level, is contingent upon the existence of external pressure from the product 
market as well as internal pressure arising out of managerial motivations. 
Profit maximization25, so long as it remains the managerial objective, 
assures economic efficiency in the decision making of the firm. However, 
ownership by outside stockholders may yet induce the management of the 
firm to make decisions which do not lead to the minimum possible cost. 
For, this type of ownership may not result in the requisite control in the 
decision making process. Even under these circumstances it appears that 
there would be a reduction in cost below the purely market mode of 
borrowing at a fixed interest rate even if the costs are not the minimum 
possible. Hence, the lack of internal pressure reduces the consumer welfare
24 It should be noted that throughout this section both X\ and S have been taken to be the 
choices of the management. Consequently, the efficiency in the choice of S should also be 
considered explicitly. In contrast to the choice of x l which is bought on the market the choice 
of S is organization related. However, in the neoclassical welfare economics framework, which 
is being adopted here, the efficiency in the choice of S is related to cost minimization for a 
given Y. The choice of S, in turn, affects the cost curve only through B and the changes in the 
interest rates. It can then be inferred that the analysis of the efficiency of S  would be
analogous to that of x l and all the foregoing results carry over with minor algebraic
modifications. The details will not be presented since the reader can readily work them out.
24 The objective of growth of output of the firm can also be shown to preserve this
internal pressure.
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below the maximum attainable but still generates a level of welfare which 
is above that possible in the absence of alternative organizational and/or 
governance structures. The lack of external pressure will be more damaging 
from a welfare viewpoint. For, in such a case there is an increase in output 
price over and above the consumer valuation of the product but the 
managerial propensities may be such that costs will eventually catch up 
with the higher prices.
5. Some Further Issues
The financial choices, when viewed as governance structures, have 
been shown to affect consumer welfare in the following manner: (a) So long 
as the firm has internal pressure to maximize profits and/or market value of 
the firm and specific financial choices do not have the effect of reducing 
external pressure both the choices of the financial and real variables by the 
management would be efficient, (b) So long as the alternative governance 
structures have the effect of reducing external pressure there will be ineffi­
ciency even if the firm is a profit maximizer, (c) The absence of internal 
pressure can, in general, create inefficiency. This effect will be in addition to 
the other.
However, it can be expected that the alternative organizational struc­
ture becomes viable only if there is some cost reduction in contrast to the 
purely market mode. The welfare gains obtained from the alternative 
governance mechanism may not be the maximum that can be expected. 
This is the only notion of inefficiency which can be sustained in such 
organizational contexts.
Much of the literature on vertical integration accepts transaction costs 
as a component of the cost of producing a given level of output. In particu­
lar, the Coase (1937) diagram in Fig. 3 could not be drawn without it. The 
make vs. buy decision is actively a result of these transaction cost considera­
tions. Though the transaction costs of using the capital markets are equally 
important and the alternative governance structures in the financial context 
also resemble a make vs. buy decision the same costing procedure has not 
yet been accepted. Extending the cost curves of this study, which were 
taken from Vickers (1978, 1987), to include the Williamson (1988a, 
1988b) and DeAlessi and Fische (1987) argument can however be shown to 
validate the basic propositions stated earlier.
The major problem is of course that most of the implicit transaction 
costs in this framework refer to managerial attitude towards loss of control
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and/or takeover. Objectively defined costs of flotation and redemption of 
common stock will be more readily acceptable as components of transaction 
costs within the framework of neoclassical welfare economics. But the sub­
jective preferences of the shareholders and managers cannot be included in 
the normative framework without further analysis.
The concept of welfare maximum itself needs to be reexamined in the 
presence of stock market financing. The basic problem is that the cost 
minimization requirement of welfare maximum will have to be defined after 
taking into account the managerial and shareholder attitudes towards the 
risks associated with the seperation of ownership from control. Gravelle 
(1982) and DeAlessi (1983) argued that the profit, which is a share of the 
owners and managers of the firm in the total welfare generated by the 
production of the firm, should be replaced by the sum of the utilities of the 
management and the shareholders as they perceive it. This would, however, 
be counter to the neoclassical welfare paradigm which emphasizes the net 
utility, over the social cost of production, to the consumers of the product. 
It is clear that there is a welfare loss over and above the allocative inefficien­
cy induced by the product market imperfection. Its precise specification may 
yet be contested.
One of the requirements for further progress is an appropriate specifica­
tion of the welfare/preferences of the shareholders. For the ownership of 
common stock of the firm they receive short run returns in the form of 
dividends and long term capital gains due to the increase in share prices. 
How they evaluate the tradeoff between the two has to be made more 
concrete. It would even be necessary to empirically evaluate the constraints 
they place on dividends and its primacy from their viewpoint.
The problem with the specification of managerial preferences is analo­
gous. The tradeoff between the risk of loss of control and the reduction in 
the direct costs of finance implicit in the different organizational structures 
is as yet not clear. On occasions it has been observed that the management 
utilizes long term sources of funds, such as depreciation reserves and accu­
mulated reserves and surpluses, to finance short term working capital 
requirements. This saves the costs of borrowing from the money market. 
But the managerial attitude towards the foregone long term alternatives, if 
any, is not concretely identified and specified.
There has been an ambiguity concerning the active decision choices of 
the management and the residual choices which are governed by the account­
ing identities. To an extent this dichotomy depends on the perceived market 
prospects. However, a detailed specification may yet be necessary to identify 
the welfare effects of different external market conditions.
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It may therefore be concluded that there are several unresolved re­
search issues even though Williamson’s suggestion, that debt and equity 
financing should be considered as alternative governance structures, is 
fundamental and enables considerable progress in examining the behavior 
of firms under monopolistic competition.
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SCELTE FINANZIARIE DELL’IMPRESA COME DECISIONI ORGANIZ­
ZATIVE
L’articolo esamina le scelte finanziarie dell’impresa considerate come deci­
sioni organizzative e illustra le loro implicazioni in termini di costi di produzione 
e motivazioni manageriali. Viene poi analizzato l’effetto di queste scelte organizza­
tive sulla struttura del mercato. Infine, in uno schema neoclassico, vengono 
descritte le implicazioni di questi cambiamenti sul benessere.
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A POST-KEYNESIAN ANALYSIS 
OF THIRD WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES
by
Robert L ooney *
Introduction
One of the most disturbing trends in developing countries in recent 
years has been the rapid growth in defense spending. While the decade 
1975-85 saw more than a 30 percent increase in defense spending in real 
terms, third world countries as a whole showed an even greater propensity 
to spend on armaments and security — a rise of over 50 percent in defense 
spending during the same period (Deger and West, 1987, p. 1).
While the willingness of political leaders to pursue national objectives 
through military means is hardly unique to the third world, the military 
burdens of many less developing countries greatly exceed the levels even 
the most sympathetic observers would concede are adequate for national 
security needs. In fact there is increasing evidence (Mullins, 1987, ch. 2; 
McKinlay, 1989, chs. 1, 2) that the growth in military power and the 
willingness to employ it are not directly related to the state s economic 
performance or to the level of economic development. The net result of 
these trends is that some of the world’s poorest nations, as measured in 
terms of Gross National Product (GNP), are among the most heavily armed.
While the real resources devoted to national defense by developing 
countries has more than doubled over the last decade, there has been very 
little investigation by development analysts of the causes of this phenomenon.
The decisions with respect to military expenditures and arms imports are generally 
viewed as being governed by exogenous factors, outside the considerations bearing 
on allocation of public resources for development and civilian government services, 
and presented as a kind of budgetary H obson’s choice (Deger and W est, 1987, 
p. X X I).
*  Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. (U.S.A.)
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Recently, however, the magnitude of budgetary allocations to national 
defense and the austerity imposed by severe constraints on the resources 
available to third world governments have stimulated a new interest in 
accounting for the purposes and consequences of military expenditures.
There is, however, little evidence of a consensus with respect to the appropriate 
weighing of factors in an explanation of the allocation o f resources to national 
defense or in a generally-applicable model o f the interaction between security and 
economic performance (Deger and West, 1987, p. X X I).
Even at the conceptual level, economic theory does not provide any 
clear prediction of how the net impact of an increase in the military burden 
would influence growth, development, or welfare (Taylor, 1981, p. 1). 
Classical theory, for example, would predict on the basis of resource 
allocation that increases in defense will decrease investment and/or civilian 
consumption and thus reduce growth or welfare.
Keynesian theory, on the other hand, implies that in the presence of 
inadequate effective demand the operation of the income multiplier would 
imply an increase in national product, resulting from increased expenditures. 
More specifically, Keynesians generally assume, at least in the case of the 
developed countries, that in situations of excess capacity, operating with 
substantial excess capacity, additional demand and output from expanded 
military expenditure will increase capacity utilization, thereby increasing 
the rate of profit and possibly accelerating investment (Treddenick, 1985, 
79-80). Clearly, whether Classical or Keynesian effects predominate will 
determine the net impact of defense expenditures on growth (Deger and 
Smith, 1985, p. 15; Deger, 1986, ch. 4).
Because of the concentration of defense plants in the developed coun­
tries, most economists have tacitly assumed that if Keynesian defense re­
lated effects are operative, their impacts would be most likely felt in these 
economies. The developing countries, being more supply constrained and 
generally lacking indigenous defense industries, would be more logical places 
to find the Classical mechanisms operative (Looney, 1989c).
Perhaps for these reasons, Marxists have also focused their analysis of 
the causes and consequences of military expenditures largely on the ad­
vanced countries.
At least for the United States, recent empirical studies have not sup­
ported the Marxian interpretation of defense expenditures (Looney and 
Mehay, 1989). In addition, Marxists have had a hard time countering the 
argument why, given the relatively capital intensive nature of defense indus­
tries, the rate of return on these activities has not fallen over time. One
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way to get around this apparent contradiction in Marxist analysis is to 
assume that capitalist governments purchase armaments at negotiated prices. 
They tax civilian incomes and profit and redistribute the revenue in such a 
manner that the favored military producers receive a disproportionately 
higher return on their investment.
While some evidence supporting this proposition has been found in the 
third world, particularly in military regimes (Looney, 1989b), some concep­
tual problems still exist.
Still, such government intervention cannot overcome the decline in the average 
rate of profit. Rather than buttressing modern capitalism as contemporary Marxist 
economists would have it, military production hastens the fall in the rate of profit, 
and therefore, can serve only to identify the internal contradictions Marx had 
forecast (Looney, 1989b).
Probably because o f the lack of a consistent theory o f defense expenditures ap­
plicable to all countries, the major examinations to date on possible defense- 
growth relationships in the third world have been for the most part undertaken 
with resort to a theoretical empirically based macroeconomics (Deger and West, 
1987, p. 10).
Because the results of this analysis have tended to vary with sample 
size and period covered, few definitive conclusions as to the net impact of 
increased allocations to defense can be made. For example, several studies 
have indicated negative effects are likely, while others have found positive 
associations (Chan, 1985, 1987). Since there is so little theoretical analysis 
underlying this work, it is impossible to choose between competing inter­
pretations of the impacts likely to be associated with third world military 
expenditures.
The purpose of this paper is to merge several elements in the Classical, 
Keynesian and Marxist approaches to the analysis of third world military 
expenditures. The aim is to develop an empirically testable post-keynesian 
framework. Hopefully, this approach will be capable of providing insights 
not only as to the likely economic impacts associated with third world 
military expenditures, but, perhaps what is more important, a partial 
understanding of the motivations underlying these expenditures.
A Post Keynesian Framework
One of the major attractions of the post-keynesian approach to the 
analysis of the ramifications of third world military expenditures is that it
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provides an explanation of economic growth and income distribution (Loo­
ney, 1989d) -  with the two viewed as being directly linked to one another 
(Eichner, 1978; Cornwall, 1978). The key determinant to both is in­
vestment, whether measured against total national income or viewed as the 
percentage change over time.
In this regard higher military spending may have significant multiplier 
effects, particularly if concentrated on the acquisition of domestic equipment 
and supplies. It is also possible with excess industrial capacity, that positive 
industrial linkages to the non-military private sector exist. It follows that 
the demand generation emanating from the military may, through increased 
capacity utilization, expand output and thus increase the rate of return 
on capital, investment, and possibly increase growth (Deger and Smith 
1985, p. 50).
If this assessment is correct, we need to distinguish between the first 
order and second order effects of military spending. The immediate direct 
impact of a rise in military spending is likely to be higher demand, produc­
tion, and employment. These favorable effects, however, may be offset 
significantly by the indirect effects of military expenditures in reducing 
private savings and investment, which will in turn hurt longer run increases 
in productivity and growth (Deger and Sen, 1983).
Therefore both the direct and indirect effects of these expenditures 
must be considered in a net assessment of their economic impact. At the risk 
of over simplification, there are four main perspectives to this assessment 
(Chan, 1985, p. 415). The first, the “modernization” model, is most closely 
associated with Benoit (1973, 1978). Benoit acknowledged that military 
expenditures can have several unfavorable consequences:
1. Income shift (increased military spending necessarily reduces the 
civilian domestic product);
2. Military productivity effect (compared with the civilian sector, the 
government sector is characterized by slower productivity increases); and
3. Investment effect (military spending crowds out civilian in­
vestment).
However, given his finding of a positive relationship between the 
defense burden and economic growth in the third world, Benoit stressed 
some compensating favorable factors:
1. The military helps to introduce modern skills and attitudes;
2. The military’s capital expenditures (e.g., roads, bridges, airports) 
have alternative civilian uses and help to strengthen a country’s economic 
infrastructure; and
3 • Defense spending leads to mild inflation which in turn, encour-
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ages fuller utilization of production facilities. In Benoit’s view, these indirect 
positive effects of defense spending outweigh its direct or indirect negative 
effects on economic growth.
Part of the problem in applying a post-keynesian approach to third 
world defense issues stems from the fact that developing countries are far 
from homogeneous. One would expect the impact of increased defense 
expenditures on the Brazilian economy to vary somewhat from that experi­
enced in Chad. Similarly, countries with an indigenous arms industry (Loo­
ney, 1988, ch. 4) should experience ceteris paribus different defense/in- 
come multipliers than those found in non producing nations (where ceteris 
paribus a larger proportion of increased military expenditures is likely to 
wind up in imported weapons).
How governments allocate expenditures can have a significant impact 
on the relative incomes of the middle- and high-income groups. A major 
middle-income group is made up of professionals and administrators employ­
ed by the public sector. By raising the salaries of these emplyees, the 
government can easily improve the position of the middle class. On the 
other hand, an increase in purchases of military hardware would increase 
the relative incomes of influential middlemen and contractors.
A recent study of Saudi Arabian public sector expenditures illustrates 
this phenomenon. Here Kavoussi (1983, pp. 75-76) notes that in the after- 
math of the oil price increases of 1973, government expenditure clearly 
shifted from wage and salary payments to purchases of military goods and 
investment in machinery and construction. By 1979, the share of wages and 
salaries in total government expenditure had been reduced to one half of the 
1973 level. In contrast, during the same period, the share of investment 
increased twenty percentage points to about one-half of all public sector 
outlays. Immediately after the oil price increase, the proportion of gov­
ernment expenditure spent on military purchases increased from 25 to 35 
percent and remained at that level until 1977. The slowdown in the growth 
of military expenditures in 1978 caused a larger increase in the share of 
investment than in the share of wages and salaries.
Due to the lack of reliable data on income distribution, we assume 
below that changes in the share of consumption in GDP are reflective 
of income distributional changes. That is, since the lower income groups 
consume a large portion of their incomes, a reduction in the share of private 
consumption in gross domestic production indicates a deterioration in the 
distribution of income.
In short, if the post-keynesian approach toward third world military 
expenditures is correct, we should expect significantly different patterns of
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growth and distribution associated with military expenditures in arms produc­
ing and non producing countries.
Impact of Military Expenditures on Consumption and Investment
Without excess capacity, increased military expenditures will either 
reduce civilian consumption or else capital formation and thus growth. A 
priori the impact of the military burden on private consumption after con­
trolling for savings, government revenues and the resource balance, could 
either be positive or negative. However, taxes and savings should reduce the 
share of private consumption in GDP, with larger deficits in the balance of 
payments facilitating increases in the share of consumption in GDP:
PRB =  /[A S  (-), RBB (-), RTCRYB (-), MEP(?)].
Where:
PRB =  the average share of private consumption in GDP, 1970-82 
AS =  average savings rate, 1970-82
RBB =  the average resource balance as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
RTCRYB =  average government revenues as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
GETYB =  average government expenditures as a % of GDP, 1970-82 
MEP =  average per capita military expenditures, 1970-82
For the non-Producers:
(1) PRB =  -  0.49 AS -  0.33 RBB -  0.41 RTCRYB +  0.56 MEP
( -  2.44) (-  3.27) ( -  2.58) (3.47)
d f =  30; r2 =  0.751; F =  19.04
For the Producers:
(2) PRB =  -  0.77 AS -  0.18 RBB -  0.03 RTCRYB -  0.75 MEP
(-  5.38) (-  1.46) ( -  1.02) ( -  5.26)
df =  17; r2 =  0.768; F  =  18.48
An interesting pattern therefore exists whereby the military burden 
appears to be associated with higher consumption in the non arms produc­
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ing countries. In sharp contrast, increases in the military burden appear to 
come at the expense of consumption in the arms producing nations.
In contrast, the impact of the military burden on the share of in­
vestment in GDP (GDIB) is reversed, i.e., the military burden is associated 
with increased levels of investment in the arms producing countries and 
decreased levels of investment in the non-producing countries. More speci­
fically:
Non-Producers:
-  0.61 RBB +  0.48 GETYB -  0.41 MEP 
( -  4.57) (4.31) ( -  3.59)
d f =  293; r2 =  0.775; F =  20.08
-  0.74 RBB -  0.48 GETYB +  0.55 MEP 
( -  4.34) (-  1.35) (2.86)
df =  17; r2 =  0.762; F =  10.41
Where:
GDIB =  the average share of investment in GDP, 1970-1982 
GETYB =  the share of government expenditure in GDP, 1970-82
How can these differential impacts of the defense burden — increased 
investment and reduced consumption — associated with increased defense 
burdens in the arms producing countries and vice versa for non-producers, 
be explained?
Interestingly enough, these results are consistent with those likely to 
be found as a result of economic disarticulation (Taylor and Bacha, 1976). 
Particularly in the case of semi-industrialized LDCs, there is likely to be a 
group of dynamic leading industries specializing in production of automo­
biles, machinery, consume durables and military equipment. Higher arms 
spending selectively stimulates demand for products from precisely these 
sectors.
The resulting output increases require employment of relatively skilled 
and managerial workers at high incomes; their “modern” tastes as consum­
a i  GDIB =  0.88 AS 
(6.47)
Producers-.
(4) GDIB =  0.98 AS 
(6.05)
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ers causes a second round of leading sector demand. If extra demand were 
met by diversion of capacity from industries producing commodities favored 
by less skilled workers and the poor, then the stage would be set for a 
growth process supported by a squeeze on wage goods. Investment would 
be stimulated by the increase in output in leading sectors, adding still more 
demand pressure. There would be additional generation of high income 
consumer purchases and so on.
The whole process operates under a resource constraint, but it is 
evaded by diversion of capacity from sectors producing wage goods in the 
process; only the poor lose by slow growth of production in commodities 
suited to their needs (Taylor 1981, p. 4).
The net effect might also be to lower the overall output to capital 
ratio, as observed above for the arms producers, because wage goods tend 
to be more labor intensive than arms production or consumer durables.
Ih is sort of mechanism can support faster growth when there are 
significant differences in consumption patterns between poor and rich, for 
example, in demands for food and consumer durables.
The net effect in the arms producing countries would be a more likely 
increase (than in the case of non-producers) in investment (due to direct 
linkages) and declines in overall private consumption (since lower income 
groups consume a higher proportion of their incomes) associated with in­
creases in the military burden. While the same investment and consumption 
could conceivably occur in the arms producing countries, the likelihood is 
that there would be much less. In fact, these countries might experience a 
more direct positive relationship between added personnel and consumption 
with increased military burdens and reduced levels of investment due to 
few direct linkages associated with an increased military burden.
These are precisely the patterns for arms and non-arms producers 
identified by the empirical analysis above.
Inflationary Impacts of Defense Expenditures
It is possible that the linkages between the defense burden and 
consumption observed for the arms producing countries could, instead of 
the mechanisms outlined above, be caused by inflation and the resulting 
forced savings impact on private consumption (together with a stimulating 
impact on overall investment).
According to this line of reasoning, one might also expect the inflation­
ary impact of increased defense expenditures to be greater for the arms
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producers (due to capacity constraints and policies of domestic absorption). 
Non-arms producers could, in part, meet added military burdens through 
constant price imports.
In fact, a number of writers have argued that defense spending raises 
demand without increasing supply, and, therefore, that it does not contri­
bute to current or future standards of living. Moreover, because more of this 
spending goes to the procurement of capital goods than do other forms of 
government spending, it is more inflationary. It is also less resistant to 
prices and wage increases as military procurement from domestic suppliers 
is often negotiated on a cost-plus basis. Thus, defense spending may be 
disproportionately a cause of cost push inflation.
Finally, because officials are usually reluctant either to raise taxes or to 
cut back other spending to finance additional defense expenditures, their 
resort to budget deficits and public debt tends to generate further inflationar- 
y pressure (Chan, 1985, p. 418).
According to this line of reasoning, the inflationary impacts of in­
creased military budgets might be expected to be higher in the arms produ­
cing countries.
To test for the inflationary impact of increased defense burdens, a 
simple model was developed whereby inflation between 1970 and 1982 
(INFB) was postulated to be influenced positively by:
1. inflation in the 1960-70 period (INFA) -  to control for chance 
high or low inflation countries
2. the average per capita military expenditure (M E?), 1970-82; and
3. the average share of public consumption (PCB) in GDP 1970-82
(.PCB).
Public consumption was introduced to correct for any biases that might 
occur from a high correlation between overall public secror consumption 
and the military burden, i.e., the higher the share of public consumption in 
GDP ceteris paribus the greater the aggregate consumption demand and the 
fewer the private sector consumer goods available to meet that demand.
The results were as follows:
Producing Countries-.
INFB =  0.62 PCB +  0.80 INF A -  2.19 MEP 
(3.09) (7.71) ( -  2.19)




(6) INFB =  0.21 PCB +  0.76 INFA +  0.02 MEP
( -  2.14) (7.79) (0.24)
df =  28; r2 =  0.614; F =  12.36
The negative impact of the military burden in the producing countries 
clearly invalidates the forced savings explanation of falling private consump­
tion and increased investment found with increased military burdens. The 
income distributional demand profile alteration and resource shift mecha­
nism outlined above (in the discussion of private consumption) tends to be 
supported, or at least not invalidated, by the observed patterns of military 
burden and inflation.
With regard to the impact on growth of defense expenditures, while 
Benoit’s suggestion that defense spending could encourage fuller utilization 
of the existing productive facilities may be particularly relevant for the 
defense producers, it has much less relevance for the non-producers. The 
latter countries are likely to be more constrained by supply. The supposed 
benefits of defense spending may simply impose additional burdens on the 
economy through expanded salaries, etc., producing excess demand for 
goods and services in general. The net result might well be slower, rather 
than faster, economic growth.
Impact of Military Expenditures on Productivity
A more subtle effect military expenditures may have on the economies 
of developing countries may be through the impact of military expenditure 
on absorptive capacity. If cooperating factors, such as technical personnel, 
infrastructure, vital intermediate imports, craft skills, and so forth are di­
verted to the military as a consequence of defense spending, then the produc­
tivity (or rate of return) of investment will drop. The result will be a 
reduction in the demand for new productive capital formation and a deceler­
ation in overall economic growth.
On the other hand the counter argument would claim that defense 
expenditure has a high productivity enhancement effect, since it contributes 
to skill formation, technical and vocational training, and the creation of 
new infrastructure (Deger and Sen, 1983, p. 50). In like fashion, skills 
imparted by military education and drill (knowing how to drive, functional 
numeracy and literacy, craft skills, etc.) remain with trainees for life. If
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soldiers are mostly conscripts, they may rapidly carry their acquired learning 
back to productive use in civilian life.
Regardless of which mechanism predominates, the net impact of in­
creased military burden on the productivity of capital should manifest itself 
in changes in the output capital ratio (ICOR) (here defined as the growth in 
real GDP 1970-82 divided by the growth in domestic capital formation 
over the same period).
If the net effect of an increase in the military burden is to reduce the 
productivity of capital (and presumably its rate of return), increased defense 
expenditures should have a negative sign when regressed on ICOR. Several 
other factors could, however, simultaneously reduce overall productivity 
and must therefore be controlled for.
These include:
1. The growth in public sector consumption (PCGB) i.e., an expan­
sion in “unproductive” public sector consumption might divert resources 
from production capital formation.
2. Inflation (INFB) might also reduce capital productivity and/or 
absorption through diversion of investment towards more speculative ac­
tivity.
The model used to test for the possible effects of military expenditures 
was therefore specified as:
ICOR =  /[PCGB  (-), INFB (-), MEP (-)]
where:
PCGB =  the growth in real public consumption, 1970-82 
INFB =  the rate of inflation, 1970-82
MEP =  the average military expenditure per capita, 1970-82.
The results:
Producing Countries-.
(7) ICOR =  -  0.14 PCGB +  0.42 INFB -  0.87 MEP 
( -  0.98) (3.06) ( -  7.16)
df =  18; r2 =  0.808; F =  21.16
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Non-Producing Countries-.
(8) ICOR =  0.21 P C G B -  0.22 INFB -  0.12 MEP
(1.24) ( -  1.40) ( -  0.75)
d f =  38; r2 =  0.114; F  =  1.51
The results for the arms producers indicate that increased military 
burdens have a highly significant and negative impact on the productivity 
of investment. The non-arms producers, in sharp contrast do not experience 
any statistically significant impacts of military expenditure on investment 
productivity.
In sum, the empirical results tend to confirm one of the hypotheses 
outlined earlier: increased military expenditures in countries with an indige­
nous arms industry may result in that industry (due to government priorities 
on defense and defense related activities) pre-empting scarce managerial, 
scientific and technical inputs from the private sector. The net result being 
one of reducing the rate of return (as proxied by the incremental capital 
output ratio) on investment.
Determinants of Military Expenditures
Traditionally, the bulk of the literature (Maizels and Nissanke, 1987) 
on third world military expenditure has stressed external or strategic-politi­
cal variables as critical in affecting allocations to defense. Recent research 
(Looney, 1988; Looney and Frederiksen, 1988) however, indicates that 
overall expenditure constraints may ultimately set the actual range in which 
military expenditures are likely to fall.
In terms of the producers and non-producers, the results of a small 
model linking arms production, resource constraints, military expenditures 
and arms imports (Looney, 1989a), demonstrated that a high proportion of 
the various measures of resources allocated to the military in arms produc­
ing countries can be accounted for by internal (economic) factors. On the 
other hand, non-producer environments were found to be relatively more 
susceptible to external factors. Apparently, the possession of an indigenous 
arms industry results in ongoing demands to maintain relatively high (and 
stable) levels of defense expenditures.
Extending these findings, the general form of the military expenditure 
relationship was specified as:
MEP =  / [ GNPPER ( + ) ,  GDB (?), PCB ( + ) ]
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Where:
the average level of per capita military expenditures, 1970-82 
the average per capita income, 1970-82 
the average share of government borrowing in GDP, 1970-82 




(10) MEP =  0.21 GNPPER +  0.29 GDB +  0.43 PCB
(2.22) ( -  3.37) (2.94)
r2 =  0.921; F =  142.18
Non-Producers:
(11) MEP =  0.59 GNPPER -  0.46 GDB +  0.09 PCB
(4.73) ( -  5.82) (0.87)
r2 =  0.892; F =  122.36
Apparently the governments of non-producing countries may not face 
the same political pressures to maintain high levels of defense expenditures 
during periods of low external threat simply to maintain employment in 
defense plants. In these countries, there is not a strong link between militar- 
y expenditures and government borrowing. Nor is there a close relationship 
between military espenditures and the share of resources accounted for by 
government consumption.
For the arms producers, hardly any output from defense plants is 
absorbed by external markets. This places great pressure on internal sales to 
sustain efficient levels of production. Arms producers appear to respond to 
this need by resorting to borrowing to sustain defense expenditures. In 
addition the close link between military expenditures and the share of 
government consumption in GDP suggests some sort of “Military Keynesian­
ism” based on stimulating demand in defense plants during deflationary 







In addition, the producing countries appear to finance a large part of 
their military expenditures with external debt and therefore are not necessari­
ly shifting domestic resources away from productive activities to produce 
arms. Tighter controls on foreign lending to these countries would undoubt­
edly make arms production somewhat less attractive.
The Impact of Military Expenditures on Overall Growth
The analysis in the previous sections suggested several mechanisms 
through which increased military burdens may, depending on whether or 
not the country is an arms producer, impact on the growth process. As 
shown above, arms producers are characterized by a shift in income from 
households to the public sector associated with increases in the military 
burden. While this shift does not appear to be inflationary in and of itself, 
there is reason to believe the net impact on income distribution may be 
regressive. In sharp contrast, non-arms producers appear to shift resources 
toward the private sector (in the form of increased consumption) as the 
military burden increases.
A priori one can argue that the net impact of these income distributio­
nal shifts might be one of increased or decreased growth. A logical case could 
also be that, given the many other factors impinging on third world growth 
rates, the overall impact of increased military burdens is likely to be rather 
insignificant.
Operationally, the role of the military burden (MEP) in effecting over­
all growth in third world countries was examined by determining its impact 
on the margin after other growth inducing and inhibiting factors had been 
accounted for (Looney and Frederiksen, 1986):
GDPGB =  / [ GDIGB ( + ) ,  INFB (-), RBB ( + ) ,  MEP (?)]
Where:
GDPGB =  average rate of growth of real GDP, 1970-82 
GDIGB =  the growth in investment, 1970-82 
INFB =  the rate of inflation, 1970-82
RBB =  the average resource balance as a % of GDP, 1970-82
MEP — the average share of military expenditures in GNP, 1970-82
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The results:
Arms Producing Countries'.
(9) GDPGB =  0.74 GDIGB -  0.29 INFB +  0.40 RBB +  0.35 MEP 
(3.80) ( -  1.62) (2.62) (2.09)
df =  19; r2 =  0.736; F =  10.50
Non-Producing Countries-.
(10) GDPGB =  0.92 GDIGB -  0.15 INFB +  0.05 RBB -  0.59 MEP 
(7.24) (-  1.87) (0.52) ( -  4.23)
df =  45; r2 =  0.639; F =  19.27
Again a contrasting pattern appears whereby the military burden 
tends to inhibit growth in the non-producing countries and stimulate it in 
the arms producing countries.
Conclusions
Benoit’s work on the impact of military expenditures has attracted 
considerable attention over the past twenty years for at least three reasons:
1. His analytical reasoning is persuasive in the sense that there is 
good economic logic behind the claim that defense expenditures can, at least 
in the short run, increase overall growth.
2. He produced economic evidence in support of his claim as to the 
macroeconomic impact of defense expenditures.
3. His analysis shows that the transmission mechanisms of defense 
efforts to the rest of the economy may be substantially different in develop­
ing countries from those in the advanced industrial economies.
The present study has shown that a post-keynesian approach to the 
defense growth debate provides a useful framework for interactions be­
tween defense spending, the distribution of income, investment and overall 
economic growth. The analysis above provides some additional insights into 
the dynamics affecting the ultimate impact of defense expenditures on 
overall economic growth.
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Specifically it appears that the macro-linkages from the arms industry 
to the economy enable third world arms producers to minimize the adverse 
impacts on the economy often associated with increased military burdens. 
The mechanism through which this process occurs, however, appears to 
worsen the overall income distribution through the shifting of resources 
from wage goods to investment. More fundamentally the lowering of over­
all productivity of investment stemming from increased military expendi­
tures is likely to take a long run toll on growth through reducing the amount 
of investment flowing into productive capital formation.
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ANALISI POST-KEYNESIANA DELLE SPESE MILITARI DEL TERZO 
MONDO
Scopo di questo articolo è di riunire vari elementi degli approcci classico, 
keynesiano e marxista all’analisi delle spese militari del Terzo Mondo. Sulla base
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di questa sintesi risulta che un approccio post-keynesiano al dibattito sull’aumen­
to della difesa fornisce un utile schema per le interazioni fra spese di difesa, 
distribuzione del reddito, investimento e crescita economica generale. Inoltre, 
questo schema fornisce ulteriori intuizioni sulla dinamica di ciò che determina in 
definitiva l’impatto delle spese per la difesa sulla crescita economica globale.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 38 (1991), N. 9, 797-823
UN MODELLO DI ALLOCAZIONE OTTIMALE DEL TEMPO 
CON DIFFERENTI TECNOLOGIE
di
Bruno G irotto  *  e T ullio  G regori * *
1. Introduzione
È noto che la teoria dell’ottima allocazione delle risorse individuali 
nell’arco della vita si è ripartita in piu filoni di ricerca. Inizialmente si è 
considerato l’allocazione del tempo tra due attività costituite dal lavoro e 
dall’istruzione. In un momento successivo sono stati elaborati dei modelli 
più complessi che includevano, tra le possibili attività, anche il consumo di 
beni (in proporzioni fisse), riallacciandosi cosi alla teoria del consumatore.
Un altro modo di considerare la letteratura sorta in materia, nota più 
comunemente come teoria del capitale umano ', è quello di distinguere tra le 
funzioni di produzione del capitale umano. Nei modelli del « learning by 
doing » l’efficienza nella produzione di reddito e di capitale umano aumenta 
automaticamente anche durante l’attività lavorativa, cioè la funzione di pro­
duzione del capitale dipende dal tempo impiegato sia nell’istruzione sia nel 
lavoro. Invece, nei modelli dell’« on thè job training » le due attività di 
produzione sono completamente separate, cosicché il capitale umano non 
può essere ottenuto congiuntamente con il reddito (v. Killingsworth, 1982 e 
Moreh, 1980, 1985).
Noi seguiremo l’approccio dell’« on thè job training », in quanto ci 
proponiamo di esaminare il comportamento ottimale dell’individuo in presen­
za di un « trade-off » tra guadagni attuali e futuri. Infatti il soggetto econo­
*  Università degli Studi di Trieste, Dipartimento di Matematica Applicata alle Scienze 
Economiche Statistiche e Attuariali “Bruno De Finetti”, Trieste.
* *  Università degli Studi di Trieste, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, 
Trieste.
1 La nascita della teoria del capitale umano viene posta da Blaug (1976) nel 1960, anche 
se la prima rassegna in materia fu pubblicata nel Journal of Politicai Economy nel 1962. Il 
problema dell’allocazione del tempo nell’investimento in se stessi è stato l’elemento caratterizzan­
te della teoria in oggetto.
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mico, se vuole disporre in futuro di maggiori guadagni per unità di tempo, 
deve sacrificare parte dei guadagni attuali, spendendo una frazione delle 
proprie risorse nell’acquisizione di maggiore capacità di reddito (v. anche 
Brunetta e Venturini, 1987). Nell’ambito di questo gruppo i modelli di mag­
giore rilevanza sono stati quelli proposti da Ben-Porath (1967) e da Sheshin- 
ski (1968). Sheshinski, che è stato il primo ad utilizzare la teoria del control­
lo ottimo in questo ambito, propose lo studio dell’allocazione del tempo 
fisico tra istruzione e lavoro, mentre Ben-Porath analizzò successivamente 
l’effetto della presenza di un paniere di beni utilizzabile nell’acquisizione di 
capitale umano. Cosi Ben-Porath introdusse l’idea di una funzione di produ­
zione del capitale umano (pur derivandola da Becker): « we have added here 
a production function of human capital and explored some of the implications 
of its properties for the optimal path of accumulation of human capital and the 
life cycle of earnings » (Ben-Porath, 1970, pag. 363).
Questa funzione costituisce l’elemento chiave di tutta la letteratura 
sorta in seguito. È  stato detto -  Landsberger e Passy (1976) -  che i modelli 
di Sheshinski e Ben-Porath « are both conceptually embedded within the 
same theoretical structure » e che « the differences lie mainly in the specific 
way the constraints are formulated» (ib., pag. 137). Queste affermazioni 
sono solo parzialmente vere, in quanto da un lato solo Sheshinski ha deriva­
to correttamente le proprie conclusioni, mentre dall’altro le interpretazioni 
della realtà proposte sono alquanto diverse. Infatti Sheshinski intende il 
capitale umano come un indice delle qualità individuali misurato dal tempo 
dedicato allo studio ed indipendente da condizioni soggettive. Tale posizio­
ne ci pare inaccettabile perché non permette di cogliere le differenze dei 
comportamenti individuali dovuti alle diversità di efficienza nell’apprendi­
mento. Pertanto ipotizziamo che il capitale umano aumenti in modo non 
proporzionale l’efficienza del tempo impiegato nel lavoro e nell’istruzione, 
abbandonando cosi la comoda e irrealistica ipotesi che « all uses of time are 
purely and equally augmented by human capital » (Killingsworth, 1982, pag. 
270). In questo senso il nostro lavoro propone un modello piu generale, che 
ricomprende al suo interno gran parte dell’analisi condotta dagli autori sopra 
citati.
Illustriamo brevemente la struttura dell’articolo. Nella Sezione 2 espo­
niamo il modello proposto. Nella Sezione 3 ne determiniamo le soluzioni 
sotto differenti ipotesi sull’efficienza nelle due attività di produzione (una 
discussione completa è presentata nell’appendice). Nella Sezione 4 viene 
analizzato il significato economico delle conclusioni raggiunte. Anticipiamo i 
seguenti risultati:
a) In tutti i casi non si riscontrano sostanziali diversità con riferimen-
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to alla sequenza delle fasi che compongono il ciclo vitale dell’individuo, 
ovvero, se il periodo di programmazione è sufficientemente ampio, il sogget­
to si dedica prima all’attività di pura istruzione (tutto il tempo è utilizzato 
nello studio), poi all’« on thè job training » (attività mista), ed infine al puro 
lavoro (tutto il tempo è destinato al lavoro).
b) La « sensitivity analysis » mostra, invece, delle differenze notevo­
li nelle diverse ipotesi. Infatti il prezzo ombra del capitale umano presenta 
degli andamenti particolari (né immediatamente intuibili, né congruenti con 
l’impostazione « classica » della teoria del capitale umano) a seconda che 
l’individuo sia più produttivo nel lavoro o nello studio. Inoltre il tasso 
salariale ed il salario d’entrata nel mercato del lavoro risentono sia di fattori 
soggettivi dipendenti dalle diverse capacità di produzione di capitale umano, 
sia, nel caso di un mercato del lavoro imperfetto, aell elasticità del tasso 
salariale rispetto al capitale umano.
2. Formulazione del modello
Supponiamo (come in Sheshinski) che in ogni istante / (0 <  / <  T), 
l’individuo possa allocare una unità di tempo o nell attività remunerata 
(lavoro) o nell’istruzione, che fornisce il cosiddetto capitale umano. In gene­
rale, indicata con u ( t) la frazione di tempo destinata all istruzione o accumu­
lazione di capitale umano all’istante t, risulta
0 <  u (/) <  1 (2.1)
e quindi 1 -  u (t) è la frazione di tempo destinata al lavoro.
L ’obiettivo dell’individuo è quello di massimizzare, rispetto al controllo 
u (t) (funzione continua a tratti), i guadagni globalmente percepiti nell arco 
della vita lavorativa, di durata conosciuta pari a T, ed attualizzati all’istante 
iniziale della programmazione. La funzione obiettivo è allora
f  e-rlw [K (t)][ l  -  u(t)\dt, (2.2)
J  0
dove r è il tasso d’interesse, esogeno e costante in [0, T], K  (t) è lo stock del 
capitale umano all’istante t e tv (K) il tasso salariale. Assumiamo tv (K) 
funzione concava del capitale umano (come ipotizzato da Sheshinski), tale 
che:
to' (K) >  0, tv" (K ) <  0 ,w  (0) >  0, w' (0) =  +  °o . (2.3)
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L ’ipotesi io' (0) =  +  °o può essere indebolita supponendo io’ {0) suf­
ficientemente elevata. Seguendo in parte l’elaborazione di Ben-Porath, assu­
miamo poi che l’output di capitale umano dipenda linearmente dal tempo 
impiegato per il suo ottenimento e sia, invece, funzione concava dello stesso 
capitale, cioè:
Q =  u h (K);
h’ (K) >  0, h" (K) <  0 ,h (0 )  >  0, h '(0) >  5 +  r, A'(oo) =  0. (2.4)
Allora il capitale umano è un fattore che aumenta l’efficenza nell’utiliz- 
zo del tempo (« time-augmenting ») per tutte le attività in cui viene impiega­
to. Ovvero un aumento dello stock K  rende l’individuo più produttivo sia 
nell’istruzione che nel mercato del lavoro. In sostanza il modello afferma che 
i datori di lavoro pagano i lavoratori in base al capitale umano accumulato; 
inoltre la funzione di produzione prospettata in (2.4) coglie anche l’idea di 
una diversità nella capacità di apprendimento degli individui (assente in 
Sheshinski).
Poiché si ipotizza che il capitale umano sia soggetto al fenomeno del 
deprezzamento (dovuto ad es. al cambiamento tecnologico), l’equazione dif­
ferenziale che descrive l’andamento dello stesso è:
K  =  u (/) h (K ) — 8 K con 0 <  8 <  1, (2.5)
ove il tasso di deprezzamento 8 è esogeno e costante in [0, T], Avendo 
ipotizzato h (K ) >  0, si può dimostrare che, in corrispondenza di un qua­
lunque controllo u (/), le soluzioni K (t) dell’equazione differenziale (2.5), 
con condizione iniziale K  (0) =  K0 >  0 e definite sull’intervallo [0, T], 
sono funzioni non negative. Inoltre, se K0 >  0, risulta K  (/) >  0 per ogni 
te  [0, T ] ,
Quindi il nostro problema consiste nel massimizzare la funzione obiet­
tivo rappresentata dai guadagni globali (2.2) rispetto al controllo u(t), con 
U =  [0, 1] regione ammissibile (cioè u (t) e U per qualunque t e  [0, T]), 
ove la variabile di stato è soggetta al vincolo differenziale (2.5). Questo 
problema è inquadrabile come uno di controllo ottimale, in cui l’hamilto- 
niano è:
H =  p0 e-rlw (K )( l  -  u) +  P l [uh(K ) -  8K], (2.6)
Come noto, il Principio di Massimo di Pontryagin fornisce le condizioni 
necessarie di ottimalità (v. Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, teorema n. 2, pag. 85) 
che, nel nostro caso, divengono:
ALLOCAZIONE DEL TEMPO CON DIFFERENTI TECNOLOGIE 801
P(t) =  (Po, Pi (t)) *  (0 ,0 ),
Max H  [K* (/), u, p (t), t] =  H [K* (t), u* (/), p (t), t],
ueu
Pi =  Po <rrt *>' [ r  (/)] [1 -  «* (/)] -  Pl (t) {u (t) A' [JT
(2.7)
( 2 .8 ) 
(2.9)
Inoltre, poiché K  (T) è libero, risulta (v. Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, 
nota 5, pag. 86):
( 2 . 10)Po — 1>
Pi (T) =  0 (condizione di trasversalità). K  (2.11)
no«*
In seguito per comodità p x verrà sempre indicato con p. Come conse­
guenza della non negatività di p  (/), si può facilmente dimostrare che vale la 
condizione:
H  (K, p (/), t) =  Max H {K, u, p (/), t) (2.12)
u e V
è una funzione reale di K, t, concava in K  per ogni t, K.
Allora, in base al teorema di Arrow (v. Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, teorema 
n. 5, pag. 107), ogni coppia ammissibile {K* (t), u (/)) che soddisfa il 
sistema (2.7)-(2.12) risolve il problema di massimizzazione. Quindi le 
condizioni (2.7)-(2.11) sono necessarie e sufficienti per il verificarsi dell’ot- 
timalità.
Posto poi q =  ertp, le (2.8), (2.9) e (2.11) si trasformano nelle:
se w (K*)/h (K*) >  q allora u (t) =  0, (2.8a)
se w (K*)/h (K*) =  q allora u (t) e  [0, 1], (2.8b)
se w (K*)/h (K*) <  q allora u {t) =  1, (2.8c)
q =  -  w' (K*) (1 -  u )  +  q [8 +  r -  u h' (fC)], (2.13)
q (T) =  0, (2.14)
dove, per semplicità di notazione, è stata omessa la variabile tempo in 
K* (/), q (t), u (t). Tale semplificazione verrà adottata anche successivamen­
te, quando opportuno.
Sia F (K) — w (K)/h (K); supponiamo poi che w ( • ) ed h ( • ), e 
quindi F  ( • ), siano funzioni sufficientemente regolari (derivabili almeno 
due volte). Il comportamento della funzione F  non è univocamente determi­
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nato, poiché w (K ) ed h (K ) sono ambedue crescenti e concave. Allora pos­
siamo distinguere almeno i seguenti tre casi:
a) F  (K ) è costante,
b) F  (K ) è monotona crescente,
c) F {K) è monotona decrescente.
È evidente che sono possibili, ed analizzabili, molte altre situazioni, 
ma pur sempre ottenibili come combinazioni di questi tre casi.
Prima di passare all’esame del modello, osserviamo che, qualunque sia 
il comportamento di F (K), se K0 >  0 o [w (0)/h (0)] >  0, l’ultima fase 
della vita individuale è caratterizzata da un’attività costituita dal solo lavoro, 
che denominiamo « puro lavoro ». Infatti, supposto per assurdo u (t) 4= 0 
in [t0, T], per (2.8b) e (2.8c) è q ( t ) > w [ K *  (t)1/h [K* (/)] >  0; tale con­
dizione risulta incompatibile con (2.14) (infatti se K0 >  0 allora K (t) >  0 
e quindi pure w/h >  0 per ogni t).
Nel paragrafo successivo procederemo alla soluzione del modello, trala­
sciando il caso più elementare con F (K) costante, che può essere facilmente 
risolto con h (K ) e w (K) generiche. In tale ipotesi, se K0 >  0, i sentieri 
ottimali del controllo u (/) e dello stock di capitale umano K* (t) hanno 
andamenti simili a quelli esaminati nel paragrafo seguente; invece, il prezzo 
ombra del capitale umano p  (/) risulta sempre decrescente su [0, T ]2.
3. Soluzione del modello
Il modello, che qui proponiamo per uno studio dei casi b) e c) conside­
rati nel paragrafo precedente, si caratterizza per l’ipotesi:
w(K) =  K a-h{K ) =  ovvero F (K) =  K a ~ f, (3.1)
con a, P e  ]0,1[. Quindi a è l’elasticità del tasso salariale rispetto al capita­
le umano, mentre fi è l’elasticità della produzione del capitale umano 
rispetto allo stesso capitale (ovviamente se a — fi ricadiamo nel caso a)). 
Naturalmente l’andamento della funzione F  (K ) dipende espressamente dal 
valore assunto dalle due elasticità giacché F (K) è crescente e concava nel 
caso a >  /?, mentre è decrescente e convessa nell’ipotesi a  <  fi. Inoltre se 
K >  1 e a >  fi oppure se 0 <  fC <  1 e a <  fi, l’individuo risulta più
2 In questo caso il modello è risolvibile per K 0 =  0, purché h (0) >  0 (e quindi 
w (0) > 0 )  e h '(0) e R. Inoltre se la produttività iniziale del capitale umano non è molto 
elevata, cioè h (0) <  ((S +  r)/l - e ~ iS +  r) r), allora all’individuo conviene dedicarsi solamente 
al puro lavoro senza mai incrementare, nell’arco della vita, lo stock di capitale umano.
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efficiente sul lavoro; invece se K  >  1 e a  <  jS oppure se 0 <  K  <  1 e 
a >  /?, l’individuo è più efficiente nell’istruzione.
Quindi in questo modello le funzioni di produzione del reddito e del 
capitale umano sono due Cobb-Douglas a rendimenti crescenti espresse, 
rispettivamente, da:
E (t) =  [1 -  u (/)] [K (/)]“ , Q(t) =  u (t) [K
La specializzazione della funzione del tasso salariale e della produzione 
di capitale umano, non appaiono incrinare la generalità dello studio intrapre­
so, poiché il nostro obiettivo è l’analisi del comportamento individuale al 
variare delle caratteristiche dell’efficienza relativa F (K). Inoltre supponiamo 
K0 >  0. Tale ipotesi pare ragionevole poiché il capitale umano è qualcosa di 
diverso dalla semplice istruzione cumulata (come in Sheshinski); per noi il 
capitale è un indice delle qualità individuali (o dell’efficienza del soggetto), 
che possono essere innate o derivate da un periodo di istruzione obbli­
gatoria.
Le equazioni (2.5), (2.13) che regolano l’andamento del capitale uma­
no K (t) e della variabile q (/) in condizioni di ottimalità, divengono:
T K =  u ( t )K fi -  S K
(3.2)
_q  =  q (8 +  r -  u (t) p K » - 1) -  a K a ~l [1 -  u (/)].
Per ottenere le traiettorie che descrivono le soluzioni ottimali nello 
spazio delle fasi risolviamo il sistema (3.2) quando il controllo u (t) è 
una funzione costante, cioè per u (t) =  u per ogni t, con u e [0, 1], In 
particolare, tenendo conto di (2.8a), (2.8b) e (2.8c), distinguiamo i casi 
in cui k è un estremo (u =  0 o u =  1) oppure «  è un punto interno 
dell’intervallo [0, 1],
Inoltre, per rendere più agile l’esposizione, vengono qui riportate senza 
dimostrazione alcune proprietà rinviando, quando opportuno, all’appendice 
per una trattazione più particolareggiata e, ove possibile, più generale.
Esaminiamo dapprima il caso in cui u {t) — 1 per ogni t. Il sistema
(3.2) diviene allora:
' k -  KP - S K
_ q =  q [ 8 +  r - f i  K ^ 1]
e con Kj =  [fi/(8 +  r)]l^ ~ p,K 2 =  (1 /S)1̂  {Kx <  K2) risulta: 
q ^  0 K ^  K v K ^  0 <-*• K ìg K2.
(3.3)
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Si può dimostrare che il sistema (3.3) ammette un’unica soluzione (K(t), 
q{t)) che soddisfa la condizione 0 <  K  (0) =  K0 <  K2 e che passa per 
un punto assegnato (K, q), con K0 <  K <  K2, q >  0. La funzione K (t) è 
monotona crescente, la q (t) è convessa, e p e r » +  oo risulta K (t) —> K2, 
q (t)—> +  oo. Sono pertanto univocamente determinati q0 =  q (0) ed il 
tempo finito in cui la traiettoria passa per (K , q).
Quanto ora visto si può riassumere (v. anche le Figg. [A .l], [A.2] in 
appendice) con la seguente rappresentazione geometrica della traiettoria nel­
lo spazio delle fasi.
Fig. 1
Esaminiamo ora il caso in cui u {t) =  0 per qualunque t. Il sistema
(3.2) diviene ora:
' K =  - S K
<3-4 )_ q =  q {§ +  r) -  a Ka~ 1
e quindi risulta:
q ^  0 q ^  a K 0” 1 /  (8 +  r), K  <  0 <-> K  >  0.
Nello spazio delle fasi, il luogo K — 0 coincide con l’asse delle ordinate, ed 
il luogo q — 0 corrisponde al grafico della funzione q =  (aKa~ 1)/{8 +  r). 
Si può facilmente vedere che, assegnato tQ e (K, q) con K, q >  0, il sistema
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(3.4) ammette un’unica soluzione definita su [/0, +  00 [, tale che 
K (t0) =  K, q (/„) =  q.
Per rendere soddisfatta la (2.14), interessa determinare sotto quali 
condizioni su (K, q), la funzione q (t) interseca l’asse delle t. A tal fine 
considerata la funzione, definita per K  >  0 da 0  (K ) =  (aKa~ v)/(Sa 4- r), 
si può dimostrare che se q <  0  (K) allora la q (/) è, per un ben determina­
to tv positiva in [/0, ti [e diviene negativa in ~\tv +  » [ ,  mentre non si 
annulla mai se q >  0  (K). Inoltre se q >  0  (K) allora per t —> +  00 
risulta q (t) —» +  °o . Infine è agevole constatare che 0  (K) è monotona 
decrescente, e che 0  (K) >  (aK“ _1)/(5 +  r) per ogni K.
Quanto appena visto con riferimento al sistema (3.4) (v. anche le 
Figg. [A.3] e [A.4] in appendice), può essere utilmente descritto mediante 
la seguente rappresentazione geometrica nello spazio delle fasi:
Poiché il sistema (3.4) è autonomo, se q <  <P (K) l’intervallo di 
tempo At =  tx -  t0, in cui la soluzione passa da (K, q) ad un punto 
sull’asse delle K, non dipende da /0 (a parità delle altre condizioni).
Interessa ancora trovare i punti in cui i grafici delle funzioni q =  
w' (K)/(S +  r) e q =  <P (K) intersecano quello della funzione q =  F {K); 
essi si ottengono rispettivamente in corrispondenza dei seguenti valori:
K 3 =  [a/(5  4- r)]1/1_/ì, K4 =  [“ /  +  ¿ « ) ]1/1-/?-
È  immediato constatare che F (K ) $  0  (K) se e solo se K ^  K4. Osservato 
che i sistemi (3.3) e (3.4) non ammettono posizioni di equilibrio (tran­
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ne quella banale), ai fini della determinazione di eventuali punti stazionari 
della soluzione ottimale, consideriamo il sistema (3.2) nel caso in cui u (t) 
=  u e ]0, 1[, per ogni t. Quindi, avendo presente la condizione (2.8c), cer­
chiamo le soluzioni (K , q, u del sistema di equazioni K  =  0, q =  0 e 
q =  F (K). Si verifica facilmente che esiste una unica soluzione data da:
K* =  [a/(r  +  5(1  +  a -  /?))]1/1_/J, q =  (£*)<*-A, «* =  S I C 1-*.
Sussistono anche le seguenti relazioni:
Ki < k2, k} < k2, kò < k4, r  <  k2, r  <  k4-
K} ^ K *  Kx+* a =£ /?.
Prima di determinare la soluzione ottimale del nostro problema con­
viene studiare nello spazio delle fasi le pendenze q/K  delle traiettorie 
soluzioni rispettivamente di (3.3) e (3.4) nei punti del grafico della funzio­
ne q =  F  (K ). Si può dimostrare (v. appendice) che le traiettorie soluzioni 
di questi due sistemi che passano per (K , F (K) ) hanno, in corrispondenza 
di tale punto, entrambe pendenze eguali a quella della curva q =  F (K) se 
K =  K , mentre hanno pendenza rispettivamente inferiore o superiore ad 
essa se 0 <  K <  K*. È allora immediato dedurre che le traiettorie (3.3) e 
(3.4) che transitano per i punti (K, F (K)) con 0 <  K  <  K*, stanno rispetti­
vamente tutte al di sopra od al di sotto del grafico della funzione q =  F (K) 
nella striscia {(q, K) : 0 <  K <  K}.
Inoltre, fissato K0, le soluzioni di (3.3), con condizione iniziale (K0, q0), 
impiegano tempi via via minori al decrescente di q0 per arrivare sulla curva 
q =  F (K). Naturalmente ciò vale per F (K0) <  q0 <  q(p ove (K0, q0) for­
nisce la condizione iniziale della soluzione che passa per (K \ q ). Si può 
anche verificare che per ogni K e ]0, K*], le traiettorie di (3.4)r<:he passa­
no per (K, F (K)), giungono sull’asse delle ascisse impiegando tempi T via 
via minori al decrescere di Ki.
Premettiamo, come illustrazione alla discussione successiva, i seguenti 
diagrammi di fase, il primo relativo al caso a  <  /? ed il secondo al caso
3 Infatti tramite (A.4) si ottiene l’equazione:
che nel nostro caso è equivalente alla 1 -  e~ (S + r> T =  K 1 (r +  Sa)/a, da cui discende 
poi quanto affermato.
ALLOCAZIONE DEL TEMPO CON DIFFERENTI TECNOLOGIE 807
a >  /?. Osserviamo che per ¡3 — 0 riotteniamo il diagramma tracciato da 
Sheshinski (1968).
Fig. 3
A questo punto siamo in grado di caratterizzare l’andamento della 
terna ottimale {K* (t), q (/), u (t)) nel caso -  più interessante dal punto di 
vista dello studio delle fasi che compongono il ciclo vitale dell’individuo -
808 BRUNO GIROTTO e TULLIO GREGORI
in cui il capitale umano iniziale non sia molto elevato (piu precisamente con 
K >  K0 >  0). Indichiamo con T0 e T2 gli intervalli di tempo impiegati 
dalla soluzione di (3.4) per arrivare nello spazio delle fasi sull’asse delle 
ascisse rispettivamente da (K0, F  (K0)) e (K*, q ). Sia infine T1 l’intervallo di 
tempo necessario affinché la soluzione di (3.3) passi da (K0, q0) a (K*, q ).
Quindi, dato 0 <  K0 <  K*, possiamo distinguere tre casi:
1) se T <  T0, allora l’individuo si dedica esclusivamente al puro lavoro 
(u (t) =  0 per qualunque t); una traiettoria di questo tipo è indicata col 
n. 1 in Fig. 3;
2) se T0 <  T <  T1 +  T2, l’individuo passerà dalla fase di pura istruzione
(u (t) =  1 per t e  [0, tx [) direttamente al puro lavoro (u (t) =  0 per
t e ]  tx T]); vedi ad es. le traiettorie n. 2 in Fig. 3;
3) se T >  Tj +  T2, l’agente economico si dedica a tutte e tre le attività,
ovvero dalla fase di pura istruzione con u (t) =  1 per /e [0 , T{ [ passa
all’« on thè job training » con u (t) =  u — 8 Kn ~P per t 6 [Tv T -  T2], 
per terminare col puro lavoro in cui u (t) =  0 per te  \ T — T2, T] (vedi ad 
es. le traiettorie n. 3 in Fig. 3); pertanto al crescere dell’orizzonte temporale 
T aumenta la durata della fase di attività mista (on thè job training).
In tutti i casi si può facilmente determinare l’andamento nel tempo 
dello stock di capitale umano K* (t), del tasso salariale w [K* (/)] e dei 
guadagni E * (/) =  w [K* (/)] [1 -  u (/)].




T -T ,0 T» T, T >  T ,+T,
->
t
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Quindi, in presenza di tutte e tre le fasi (T >  T1 +  T2), il capitale 
umano risulta funzione inizialmente crescente per te  [0, Tl [, costante nella 
seconda fase della vita e pari a K* per te [Tv T -  T2], ed infine decrescente 
per te  ] T -  T2, T] con:
f r w  =  r f !(f- H  t0 =  t  -  t 2.
È evidente allora che, durante la fase di attività mista, la produzione 
di capitale umano serve solo a compensare l’effetto del deprezzamento. 
Naturalmente il tasso salariale denota un andamento simile a quello 
palesato dal capitale umano. Invece i guadagni E* (t) risultano inizialmente 
nulli in [0, Tx[, poiché il tempo dedicato al lavoro è pari a zero; nella 
seconda fase sono costanti e pari a:
E* (t) =  w CK*) [ 1 - 5  ÌC*1_/5] per te  [Tx, T -  T2], 
ed infine, nell’ultima fase, per t e ] T  — T2, T] risulta:
E* (t) =  w[K* 4
4. Un commento ai modelli proposti
Abbiamo detto che la novità della nostra formulazione risiede nell’aver 
introdotto una funzione di produzione del capitale umano (a differenza di
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Sheshinski) e di aver supposto che il capitale umano aumenti in maniera 
non proporzionale l’efficenza del tempo impiegato nelle due attività. Inve­
ce, in gran parte della modellistica esistente 4 le funzioni della produzione, 
in cui il tempo fisico è uno degli input, sono delle g e n e r ic h e =  f t (ut K,.) 
(con i — 1, ..., n) ove ut è la frazione di tempo fisico utilizzata nellV-esima 
attività (che può essere produzione di capitale, reddito, utilità), e K  lo stock 
del capitale umano. Ciò significa che, a parità di «¿, il tempo espresso in 
unità efficienza UjK è eguale per tutte le attività, ed è proporzionale al capi­
tale umano 4 5. Si può quindi dire che « all uses of time are purely and equally 
augmented by human capitai ... thè model treats human capitai as purely 
time augmenting » (Killingsworth, 1982, pag. 270).
In molti modelli (seguendo Ben-Porath) si ipotizza che il tassa salaria­
le sia funzione lineare del capitale w (K ) =  a K, [a >  0) 6, mentre l’output 
del capitale umano è una funzione Cobb Douglas Q =  b uT Ka Dn (h >  0), 
ove D è un opportuno paniere di beni destinati all’istruzione. Purtroppo sia 
Ben-Porath che altri autori, come Heckman (1976), si sono limitati allo 
studio di soluzioni interne (0 <  u <  1). In questo modo non vengono 
considerate tutte le cosiddette « fasi » che compongono la vita dell’agente 
economico, e che nel nostro caso sono la pura istruzione, 1’« on thè job 
training » ed il puro lavoro.
L ’idea che il capitale umano agisca in maniera diversa nei due processi 
di produzione era già implicita in Sheshinski, il quale ipotizzava come 
funzione di produzione del capitale umano Q =  u, e come funzione dei 
guadagni E — (1 — u) w (K). Per questo autore la produzione di capitale 
umano è data semplicemente dal tempo dedicato all’istruzione e quindi il 
capitale umano è identificato con le ore complessive trascorse in tale attività. 
Però, assumere che i lavoratori siano produttivi solo in base al tempo 
dedicato allo studio, è un’ipotesi decisamente discutibile. Infatti Sheshinski,
4 Vedi ad es. Heckman (1976), Blinder e Weiss (1976), K illingsworth (1982).
5 Un’eccezione è costituita dal modello proposto in G raham (1981). Da un punto di vista 
analitico il modello è di scarso interesse, poiché è un semplice modello biperiodale, con 
funzione obiettivo costituita da una funzione d’utilità. Comunque la conclusione piu interessan­
te di questo modello è l’esistenza di una correlazione (non precisata), tra accumulazione di 
capitale umano e ricchezza finanziaria iniziale. Questa, se positiva, potrebbe giustificare il 
perpetuarsi delle diseguaglianze sociali. Invece nel modello di Blinder e Weiss è stato 
dimostrato — v. Driffill (1980) — che sussiste una correlazione negativa tra ricchezza finanzia­
ria iniziale e capitale umano, mentre in Heckman (1976) l’accumulazione di capitale umano non 
è influenzata da variazioni della ricchezza finanziaria iniziale. Osserviamo che queste conclusio­
ni appaiono gli aspetti piu deboli di tali modelli della teoria del consumatore con capitale 
umano.
6 Quindi la funzione di produzione del reddito è E  =  a K (1 — u).
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nella conclusione del suo articolo, proponeva un’estensione analoga a quella 
qui condotta, senza peraltro affrontare il problema. Il modello qui elaborato 
non ha portato a conclusioni sostanzialmente diverse da quelle di Sheshinski 
per quanto riguarda il ciclo vitale dell’individuo; infatti abbiamo ritrovato 
che è l’orizzonte temporale T a determinare la sequenza ottimale delle fasi di 
attività. Solo se T è sufficientemente elevato l’individuo dapprima si dedica 
allo studio, per poi passare ad un periodo di attività mista ed utilizzare 
infine nel puro lavoro il capitale umano accumulato.
Può risultare, invece, diverso l’andamento di p (t). Tale differenziazio­
ne non è ininfluente, poiché la variabile in oggetto ha un preciso significato 
economico, su cui si fa spesso molta confusione 7. È noto che p (0), come 
dimostrato da Arrow (1968), assolve un ruolo analogo a quello dei moltipli­
catori di Lagrange, ed è il prezzo « ombra » del capitale umano valutato 
all’istante iniziale. Infatti p (0) misura il contributo di un’unità aggiuntiva di 
capitale umano in t — 0 alla funzione valore ottimale 8.
In letteratura è apparso naturale estendere questa interpretazione eco­
nomica di p  (0) a p (t), in corrispondenza a qualunque t. Qui p (t) misura la 
variazione della funzione valore ottimale V (v. nota 8) su tutto l’arco tempo­
rale [0, T] (e non sul solo intervallo \t, T]) per una variazione unitaria della 
variabile di stato K in t. Più precisamente, assegnato K0, definiamo l’estre­
mo superiore della funzione obiettivo:
V (/, v) =  sup { f  e~n w (K) (1 -  u) dt : (K (t), u (/)) ammissibile } (4.1)
•l o
7 Osserviamo comunque che il prezzo ombra del capitale umano è p (t) e non q (/), come 
affermato da Sheshinski (v. anche la nota successiva). Quindi la crescenza di q non implica 
quella di p, mentre invece la crescenza di p  implica quella di q.
8 Viene detta « optimal value function » la funzione V della variabile Kg, a valori nella 
retta compatta, definita come l’estremo superiore della funzione obiettivo di corrispondenza di 
un qualunque valore di K 0 per il quale esista una coppia (K  (t), u (t)) ammissibile. Nel nostro 
caso risulta:
V (K0) =  sup { e~rl w ( K ) ( l - u )  dt : (K (t), u (<)) ammissibile }
0
Ricordiamo che una coppia (K (t), u (/)) si dice ammissibile se u (t) è continua a tratti e 
K (t) è una funzione continua e derivabile nei punti di continuità di u (/), soluzione dell’equazio­
ne differenziale (2.5) con condizione iniziale Kg. Quindi, se esiste una coppia (K* (/), u (t)) 
ottimale in corrispondenza di Kg, allora V (Kg) è un valore reale pari all integrale calcolato in 
corrispondenza di quella coppia ottimale. Si dimostra (v. Arrow, 1968) che, sotto opportune 
condizioni (soddisfatte nel nostro modello), se in corrispondenza del valore iniziale Kg esiste 
una terna ottimale (K‘  (t), u (t),p (/)), allora V (■ ) è, in un intorno di Kg, una funzione reale, 
derivabile in K 0 con d V/d K 0 =  p  (0).
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dove l’insieme delle coppie ammissibili (K (t), u (t)) è diverso da quello 
considerato per p (0). Qui infatti una coppia si dice ammissibile se u (t) è 
continuo a tratti e K (t) è una soluzione dell’eq. differenziale (2.5), ovunque 
continua, tranne che in t dove v =  K ( t + )  -  K (t -  ). Cerchiamo cioè di 
massimizzare la funzione obiettivo con funzioni K  (t) ovunque continue 
tranne che nel punto t, ove le variabili di stato presentano un salto di ampiez­
za v assegnata (per v =  0 si ha ovviamente l’usuale problema di controllo ot­
timale). Questo è un problema di massimo con salti nella variabile di stato, e 
si dimostra, sotto opportune condizioni (v. Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, teo­
rema n. 9), peraltro soddisfatte nel nostro problema, che, supposta esistere 
una soluzione ottimale (K * (t),p (t), u (t)) per v =  0, allora la « optimal 
value function » V (t, v) assume valori reali in corrispondenza di coppie 
ottimali, in un intorno di v =  0; inoltre essa è derivabile rispetto a v 
in (/, 0) e risulta:
dV
dv il, o)
=  p  (t ) (4.2)
Solo con queste necessarie precisazioni possiamo dire che p  (t) misura 
quanto 1 individuo sarebbe disposto a cedere per ottenere un’unità aggiunti­
va di capitale umano in t.
Risulta anche evidente la spiegazione economica della condizione di 
trasversalità (2.11); infatti nell’istante finale del periodo di programmazione 
un’unità aggiuntiva di capitale umano non può aumentare il valore della 
funzione obiettivo e quindi il prezzo di tale unità è nullo.
Poiché p (t) misura la variazione di V, valutata nell’istante iniziale, 
q(t)  =  ertp (t) è il prezzo ombra corrente del capitale umano. Quindi è 
significativo esaminare solo l’andamento del prezzo valutato all’inizio del 
periodo di programmazione (e non q (t)) evidenziando le cause che lo 
determinano. Per le ragioni viste sopra non sono giustificati « facili » ragio­
namenti basati sul principio del « ceteris paribus » per spiegare economica­
mente l’andamento di p (t). Infatti variazioni dello stock di capitale in t 
possono modificare notevolmente la traiettoria ottimale in esame, poiché è 
stato osservato che « changes in these parameters (nel nostro modello K0, a, 
fi, r, L v) will change the optimal control as well as the optimal path. In 
applications it is often important to study these changes, but general results of 
any practical value turn out to be very complicated, and hard to apply. The 
reason is obvious. A change in one or more of the parameters might change 
the optimal solution in a variety of ways. For instance, a bang-bang control 
might change to a continuous control, switch-point might change drastically,
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etc. » (Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, pag. 219). Allora una variazione unitaria del 
capitale in t modifica il problema originario di massimizzazione della (2.2.) 
nel problema (4.1), e quindi, in generale, modifica la soluzione ottimale 
(K* {t), u (()) su tutto l’intervallo [0, T], Ad es., s e T > T l +  T2 e l < T 1 
(ovvero l’individuo si dedica a tutte e tre le attività ed il salto di capitale 
avviene nella prima fase di pura istruzione), l’individuo programma un 
periodo di tempo minore di pura istruzione compensato da un periodo 
maggiore di « on thè job training ». Invece per t >  T — T2 (salto durante 
l’attività di puro lavoro) aumenta il periodo di tempo dedicato al puro 
lavoro e diminuisce quello dell’« on thè job training ». Proprio-in base a 
queste considerazioni appare evidente che discussioni relative alle sole 
equazioni differenziali del prezzo (come in Landsberger e Passy, 1976) non 
sono del tutto significative 9.
Nella letteratura è ricorrente l’affermazione che il prezzo ombra è 
decrescente su tutto l’arco temporale [0, T], qualunque sia la fase della vita 
dell’individuo (v. ad es. Becker, 1962, 1975). La causa di questo fatto 
viene indicata nella diminuzione del tempo futuro in cui si può impiegare 
profittevolmente il capitale umano accumulato. Tale giustificazione è solo 
parzialmente vera, in quanto, come vedremo nel nostro modello, il prezzo 
ombra può risultare crescente, sia nella fase di pura istruzione che in quella 
di puro lavoro. Osserviamo preliminarmente che dalla (2.9) si ottiene 
rispettivamente:
con « * ( / )  =  1 p =  p { S - h '  [K* (/)]}, (4.3)
con u (() =  0 p =  Sp  -  e~rt w’ [K* (/)]. (4.4)
Era già stato adombrato da Landsberger e Passy (1976) che altre 
cause possono influire sull’andamento di p (/), oltre alla riduzione dell’inter­
vallo di tempo T — t in cui impiegare la variazione del capitale umano in t. 
La (4.3), ad es., mostra proprio come nella fase di pura istruzione entrino in 
gioco anche la produttività marginale del capitale umano ed il suo tasso di 
deprezzamento. Infatti se non si lavora, il deprezzamento rende preferibile 
disporre di un’unità aggiuntiva di capitale umano in prossimità della fine
’  La differenza sostanziale tra la nostra impostazione e quella degli autori citati è che essi 
hanno osservato correttamente, in relazione ai modelli di Sheshinski e Ben-Porath, che: « it 
should he noticed that besides the direct interest in the time distribution of the shadow price of 
human capital the results presented here indicate that different optimal trajectories for the control 
can be expected from the two models » (ib., pag. 144 la sottolineatura è nostra), senza peraltro 
dimostrare quanto affermato.
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del periodo di pura istruzione, in quanto tale unità si è deprezzata per un 
periodo di tempo minore. D ’altro canto un’unità aggiuntiva rende più 
efficienti nell’ottenimento di ulteriore capitale umano, nonché permette di 
raggiungere prima la posizione d’equilibrio (K *, q ). L ’effetto complessivo 
determina quindi la crescenza o decrescenza nel tempo del prezzo ombra. 
Nel nostro modello, dalle (4.3) — (4.4), si possono ottenere le condizioni 
sotto le quali, per valori di T sufficientemente elevati, il prezzo ombra 
risulta crescente in un certo intervallo di tempo 10. Queste sono:
r/S <  (a -  P) (1 -  P)/(i se « * ( / )  =  1, (4.5)
r/8 <  (/? -  a) se u (t) =  0, (4.6)
e mostrano che l’andamento del prezzo ombra dipende dai valori di a, [3,8 
ed r.
Consideriamo dapprima la fase di puro lavoro (u (t) =  0). Qui il 
prezzo ombra del capitale umano può essere crescente solo se a  <  /?, ovvero 
se la funzione F (K) è decrescente, ed r è piccolo relativamente a 8. Questo 
risultato è contro la comune intuizione. Infatti, come già detto, si afferma 
generalmente che dedicandosi al puro lavoro, un’unità aggiuntiva rende di 
più se è acquisita prima, poiché è possibile utilizzarla per un periodo di 
tempo maggiore. Invece secondo la (4.4) anche con u (/) =  0 è possibile 
che il prezzo ombra sia crescente se lo stesso prezzo, ponderato con il 
deprezzamento, è maggiore del tasso salariale marginale valutato all’origine. 
Poiché nella fase del puro lavoro il capitale umano diminuisce nel tempo 
(quindi decrescono anche il tasso salariale ed i guadagni), questo risultato 
appare, in prima analisi, inaspettato se si ragiona in base all’usuale principio 
del « ceteris paribus ». Infatti, se si suppone di avere, in un qualsiasi istante 
t del periodo di puro lavoro, una variazione aggiuntiva (unitaria) del capita­
le, mantenendo inalterata la soluzione ottimale in [0, T] allora si deve am­
mettere, dato l’andamento del capitale umano, che tale unità sarebbe mag­
giormente produttiva se ottenuta all’istante iniziale di questa fase. Ma que­
sto ragionamento si basa proprio sull’assunto dell’invarianza della program­
mazione ottimale in [0, T\. Invece abbiamo già osservato che variazioni
10 Risulta immediato calcolare, per u =  1, l’unico valore di K  in corrispondenza del quale 
la (4.3) si annulla. Affinché p (t) risulti crescente in un opportuno intervallo di tempo, è 
necessario che tale valore di K  sia inferiore a K .
Invece per u =  0, essendo p  =  — e~rt[w' (K) — S q \  risulta p  >  0 se e solo se q >  
[w' (K)/S], Allora, calcolato l’unico valore di K  in corrispondenza del quale w' (K)/S =  F (K), 
anche in tal caso, affinché p (t) risulti crescente in un opportuno intervallo di tempo è 
necessario che tale valore di k sia inferiore a K .
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dello stato possono provocare modifiche anche nel controllo e quindi pure 
nei sentieri programmati sin dall’istante iniziale. È  allora del tutto naturale 
che la condizione (4.6) tenga conto anche di fi pur essendo u (t) =  0. 
Osserviamo infine, a parziale giustificazione della (4.6), che anche in questo 
caso il tasso di deprezzamento favorisce lo spostamento in avanti di un’unità 
aggiuntiva di capitale umano, in quanto tale unità subisce l’effetto del dete­
rioramento per un periodo di tempo minore. A sfavore di questo spostamen­
to gioca il tasso d’interesse r, poiché diminuisce il valore attuale dei guada­
gni futuri aggiuntivi.
È evidente che, durante la fase di istruzione (con u (t) =  1), il prezzo 
può essere crescente solo se cc >  /?, cioè se la funzione F (K) e crescente. 
L ’effetto del tasso d’interesse e del deprezzamento è analogo a quanto visto 
sopra. Inoltre, se l’elasticità della produzione di capitale umano è sufficiente- 
mente piccola rispetto a quella del tasso salariale, la condizione (4.5) può 
essere soddisfatta. Ciò non deve stupire, in quanto un individuo poco pro­
duttivo nell’istruzione non ha interesse ad avere subito un’unità aggiuntiva 
di capitale a causa del maggiore effetto del deterioramento (deve pure risulta­
re S sufficientemente grande rispetto ad r) relativamente all incremento di 
capitale che ne può ricavare. In situazioni con rapida evoluzione tecnologica 
e con tassi d ’interesse bassi, a causa degli effetti evidenziati, può succedere 
che alla fine della fase di pura istruzione sia più conveniente per certi 
soggetti aspettare per ottenere un’unità aggiuntiva di capitale.
Un ultimo risultato riguarda una semplice applicazione della cosiddetta 
« sensitivity analysis ». Consideriamo la « optimal value function » come 
funzione di uno o più parametri, cioè nel nostro caso:
V (p) = su p  { f  é~rt w (K) (1 -  u) dt : (K (t), u (t)) ammissibile}, (4.7) 
d o
dove p =  (p,) è un vettore in Rs che rappresenta i parametri del modello, e 
[K (t), u (/)] sono le coppie ammissibili per l’usuale problema di controllo 
ottimale (a differenza di quanto visto nella (4.1)). Sotto opportune ipotesi 
(v. Seierstad-Sydseter, 1987, pag. 217) e supposta inoltre (K (t), u (t), 
p(t)) soluzione ottimale per (4.7) in corrispondenza di p =  p (con p un 
dato vettore in Rs), allora V (p), in un opportuno intorno di p, assume 
valori reali ed è differenziabile in p con:
dV(R) =  CT dH (K* (t), u (t),p(t), p , t )M ■ =  1; ; s
dPi J  o d Fi
(4.8)
816 BRUNO GIROTTO e TULLIO GREGORI
(v. anche Malanowski, 1984). Applicando tale risultato nel nostro modello è 
facile verificare che:
§ < ° '  f < ° '
(4.9)
Quindi un aumento del tasso di deprezzamento e del tasso d’interesse riduco­
no, come ovvio, i guadagni globali valutati all’origine. Analogamente risulta:
£ > • ■  5 > " (4.10)
Come appare intuitivo, la seconda relazione mostra che, in un mercato 
del lavoro perfetto (uguale tasso salariale per ogni individuo, a parità di K), 
coloro che sono piu efficienti nella produzione di capitale umano hanno 
maggiori guadagni globali. La prima (pure di immediata comprensione) è 
significativa solo in un mercato del lavoro imperfetto, dove individui con 
pari capitale umano percepiscono tassi salariali diversi. Inoltre, nel nostro 
modello, se T è sufficientemente elevato, è possibile analizzare come varia il 






r  (1 -  p r l ir +  s (1 -  P)]/[a (r +  8 (1 +  a  -  /?))] >  0,
=  K* ( 1 -  /?) 2 {In [a/{r +  5(1  +  a  -  /?))] +
+  (1 - 0 ) 8 / { r  +  8(  1 + a - 0 ) ) } 0.
(4.11)
(4.12)
La prima relazione mostra come, in un mercato del lavoro imperfetto, 
gli individui con maggior elasticità del tasso salariale (a parità di abilità nella 
produzione di capitale umano) entrano nel mercato del lavoro con capita­
le umano maggiore, dovuto ad un periodo maggiore di pura istruzione. 
Questi individui, invece, trascorrono (sempre nell’ipotesi T >  T1 +  T2) 
un periodo minore nella fase di puro lavoro, come è immediato dedurre 
osservando che dT2/da  <  0 n . Come già visto in (4.10), l’effetto complessi-




p-  (8 + r ) t w' [ÌC (/)] dt =  0
Si ottiene cosi T2 =  -  (Sa +  r) *ln {1 — (Aot +  r)/[8a +  r +  5(1 -/?)]} e quindi dT-Jda. <  0.
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vo è un aumento dei guadagni globali. La seconda relazione, che ha significa­
to in un mercato del lavoro perfetto, afferma che maggiore abilità nella 
produzione di capitale umano non aumenta necessariamente il tasso salariale 
d’entrata nel mercato del lavoro. Non è quindi evidente se i maggiori guada­
gni globali dovuti ad un incremento di (v. la (4.10)) siano imputabili a 
periodi maggiori trascorsi nelle attività di pura istruzione o puro lavoro. 
Comunque se ÌC* >  1, si vede immediatamente che dK*/d[i >  0. Infine, se 
T è sufficientemente grande, possiamo pure descrivere l’andamento nel tem­
po della produttività relativa del soggetto. In questo caso si alternano perio­
di di tempo in cui l’individuo è piu efficiente nel lavoro ad altri in cui è piu 
efficiente nell’istruzione.
APPENDICE
Consideriamo il sistema costituito dalle equazioni (2.5) e (2.13), con generiche funzioni 
w (K ), h (K):
" K =  u (t)h (K )  -  S K
(A.l)
_ q =  q [8  +  r -  u (t) h ' (K)] -  w' (K ) [1 -  u (/)]
con (A.la). Si vede facilmente che nelle ipotesi (2.3M2.4) esistono K h K 2(K l <  K 2) tali che:
q S  0 «-» 8 +  r ^ h ' (K) «-» e
K ^ O ^ h ( K )  ì z 8 K ~ K ì z K 2.
Ovviamente per questo sistema non esistono posizioni d’equilibrio (eccetto il caso banale 
(K, q) =  (0,0) se ¿ (0 )  =  0). Determiniamo ora l’unica soluzione del sistema (A.la) che soddi­
sfa alla condizione K2 >  K  (0) =  K0 >  0, e che passa per un punto assegnato (K, q) con 
K0 < K <  K 2, £  >  0. Consideriamo dapprima l’equazione differenziale relativa al capitale 
umano, con condizione iniziale K  (0) =  K0. Modificando opportunamente il ragionamento con­
dotto in Pontriaguine (1975, pag. 114), si dimostra che la soluzione non prolungabile K (t) 
(con t >  0) di tale equazione è definita su [0, +  00 [, e che K (t) è ivi monotona crescente con:
lim K (t) =  K2.
t — > + oo
Quindi l’andamento di K  (t) è descritto dal seguente grafico:
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Fig . [A.l]
ove K  (/') =  K h K (T {) =  K  (e quindi h '[K  (/')] =  & +  r).
La seconda equazione differenziale di (A. la) è omogenea e quindi





A (t) =  S +  r — h' [K  (/)], q0
In base all’andamento di K (t) è immediatamente deducibile quello della funzione conves­
sa q (!), qui sotto rappresentata:
Fig . [A.2]
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È evidente che, per +  °o, A (/) - +  S +  r -  h '(K 2) >  0, e quindi q ( t ) - * + ° o .  
Risulta cosi determinato il tempo T i in cui l’unica soluzione del sistema (A. la) transita in 
(A, q). Quanto ora visto si trova riassunto nella Fig. 1 del terzo paragrafo. Esaminiamo ora il 
caso u (t) =  0 per qualunque /, ed indichiamo con (A.lb) il corrispondente sistema. Si 
vede facilmente che q ^  0 «-» q ^  w' (K)/(S +  r) e K  <  0 <-> K  >  0. Il luogo q — 0 rappresen­
ta una funzione decrescente di K  (che tende asintoticamente a +  °°  per K  —» 0 se w (0) 
-  +  °°). Quindi se w (0) =  +  ■=■= non esistono posizioni d’equilibrio per il sistema (A.lb), 
Se, invece, w’ (0) e  R, allora esiste un’unica posizione d’equilibrio di (A.lb) data da (0, w' (0)/ 
(8 +  r)).
Si può facilmente vedere che, assegnato t0 e (A, q) con K ,q >  0, il sistema ora considera­
to ammette un’unica soluzione in [/„, +  °° [, tale che K  (/0) =  K, q (/0) =  q. La soluzione del­
la equazione differenziale del capitale umano è in [¿g, +  °° [:
K ( t ) = K e - ^ ‘ - ‘ o) (A.3)
Allora la seconda equazione di (A.lb), tenendo conto di (A.3) e della condizione iniziale 
q (¿o) =  £» ha come soluzione in [/q, +  °°  [ :
r(t) =  e^  +  'H'-'O» ? - -(i +  r> l'- 'O )» ' (K e-J | '-'o>) dt (A .4)
Posto
e-(f + r)‘ w’ (Ke~St) dt, (A.5)
poiché e ^ + r> 1 w ' [K (/)] è infinitesima per / —*  +  oo di ordine superiore ad e~rl, si vede 
immediatamente che 0  (K) risulta una funzione a valori reali, definita per K >  0, positiva de­
crescente; inoltre, essendo w '(-)  e K (■  ) funzioni decrescenti, si ha
c + 00
I . w' (K)
0 ( K ) >  I e-^  + r ‘̂ w'(K)dt = -----— .
] „ S +  r
Osservando che la funzione e ^  ^ rì 1 w' [A {/)] è sempre positiva, è facile dimostrare che 
se £  <  0  (K), allora q (t) è -  per un ben determinato -  positiva in [ig, t1 [ e diviene 
negativa in ] th +  °°  [ (mentre non si annulla mai se q >  0 (K)), e che l’intervallo di 
tempo (ti -  t0) non dipende da t0 (sistema autonomo). Inoltre, se q >  0  (X), q (t)-+  +  °o 
per / - > +  » .
Quanto ora esposto può essere visualizzato mediante i grafici [A.3] e [A.4] e sintetizzato 
nello spazio delle fasi dalla Fig. 2 del paragrafo 3:
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Esaminiamo infine il caso in cui « ( / ) = «  e  ] 0, 1 [ per qualunque t, ed indichiamo 
con (A. le) il relativo sistema. In particolare cerchiamo posizioni di equilibrio (K, q) per 
(A.le) con K  >  0, q >  0, ovvero soluzioni del sistema:
uh(K ) -  S K  =  0
w '(K) [h (K) -  S K] 
q ~  8[h(K ) -  h ’ (K )K ] +  rh (K )
(A.6)
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Tale sistema, se compatibile, ammette un’unica soluzione (K,q), con 0 <  K <  K2, che 
fornisce l’unica posizione d ’equilibrio di (A.le); inoltre è q >  0, come si può dedurre 
osservando che, dal teorema della media, per la decrescenza di h' (K), segue che h (K) — 
h (0) >  h' (K) K  >  0. Osserviamo che il sistema (A.6) nelle ipotesi (2.3) — (2.4) è sicuramente 
compatibile se h (0) > 0  oppure se « h' (0) >  S (ovvero se si può profittevolmente produrre 
capitale umano anche non avendone a disposizione oppure se l’incremento relativo iniziale del 
capitale stesso è maggiore del tasso di deprezzamento).
Per ottenere le soluzioni del nostro problema di ottimo, tenuto conto di (2.8 b), risulta 
utile vedere se esiste un controllo u (t) =  « j, con « j  e ] 0, 1 [, in corrispondenza del quale il 
punto di equilibrio (Klt £ t) di (A.le) stia sulla curva di equazione q =  w(K)/h(K), con 





< W (K )h (K ) -  w (K )h '{K ) q [ (S +  r) -  h' (ff)] _  g (S +  r )-w '(K )  
h2 (K) h(K) -  S K  -  SK
_  w(K)
, q h(K)
Se (Klt qy u) è soluzione di (A.7), la seconda relazione mostra che le traiettorie di (A.la) e 
(A.lb) passanti per (Klt q{) ed il grafico della funzione F (K) =  w {K)/h{K) hanno tangente 
comune in (Kit q_{). Per rendersene conto, basta considerare i rapporti q/K  rispettivamente 
in (A.la) e (A.lb).
A conclusione studiamo le pendenze delle soluzioni di (A.la) e (A.lb) nei punti del 
grafico della funzione q =  F (K), in relazione alla pendenza di questa curva, nell’ipotesi 
che (A.7) ammetta l’unica soluzione (Kh q j, u j). A tal fine consideriamo il sistema:
——  F ' (K) =  0 
K
q = F ( K )
(A.8)
In relazione ad (A.la) e (A.lb), tramite (A.8) si ottengono, rispettivamente, le equazioni:
B (K ) =
F (K ) [S +  r - h ' ( K )] 
h (K ) -  SK
-  F ' (K) =  0, (A.9)
C(K) =
F (K) (S +  r) -  w'(K) 
- S K
-  F ' (K) =  0. (A.10)
Tenendo conto di (A.7), entrambe le equazioni hanno come unica soluzione e quindi 
ciascuna delle due funzioni continue B (K) e C (K) ha segno costante in ] 0, K\ [.
Ritornando ora al modello (3.1), in cui h (K) =  K^ e w (K) =  Ka, le equazioni B (K) =  0
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e C (K) =  0 hanno pertanto l’unica soluzione K*. Inoltre è facile verificare che, per K —*0 ,  
B ( K ) - + — °°  e C ( K ) - * +  oo, e quindi in ] 0, X *[  risulta B (K) <  0 e C (K) >  0. Ciò 
significa che, nell’ipotesi (3.1), in ogni punto del grafico della funzione q =  F  (K) con 
K e ] 0 , K * [ ,  le traiettorie relative ai sistemi (A.la) e (A.lb) hanno pendenze rispettivamente 
inferiore e superiore rispetto a quella del grafico della funzione q =  F  (K) nel medesimo 
punto. Si può dedurre allora che le traiettorie di (A.la) e (A.lb) che transitano nello spazio 
delle fasi per i punti (X, F  (X)) con 0 <  X  <  X*, sono, rispettivamente, tutte al di sopra od al 
di sotto del grafico della funzione q =  F  (X) nella striscia { (q, K) : 0 <  X  <  X }.
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AN OPTIMAL TIME ALLOCATION MODEL WITH DIFFERENT TECH­
NOLOGIES
The model provides the solution for optimal time allocation between two 
activities (work and training) in a finite time horizon within a human capital 
framework. This model extends the formulations given by Ben-Porath (1967) 
and Sheshinski (1968), as it shows how the solution depends on marginal 
productivity of human capital and income. Moreover human capital shadow 
price displays characteristic patterns assuming that marginal productivities are 
different. This behavior reflects the change of the control over the entire 
programming time. Nonetheless “life cycles” are similar to those considered 
by Sheshinski.
_
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TRADE RESTRICTIONS, TERMS OF TRADE AND WELFARE 
UNDER VARIABLE RETURNS TO SCALE
by
Chi-Chur Chao *  and E den  S.H. Y u * *
1. Introduction
The welfare consequences of an exogenous shift in the terms of trade 
have been examined by several trade and development economists. Prebisch 
(1950) and Singer (1950) propose that the secular deterioration in the terms 
of trade facing the developing countries reduces income and welfare. Batra 
(1973) demonstrates that the losses in the terms of trade need not imply 
lower national income if there are factor market imperfections. Recently, 
Anam (1988) argues that a decline in the terms of trade may improve 
welfare in the presence of quota-induced rent seeking activities.
The present paper offers an alternative explanation as to why a dete­
rioration in the terms of trade may paradoxically enhance welfare of a small 
open economy. In particular, we will consider an economy which is character­
ized by variable returns to scale in production. We will derive and contrast 
various welfare effects of a change in the terms of trade when this small 
economy pursues alternative trade policies, i.e., tariffs vs. quotas. The main 
novelty of this paper is the asymmetry between tariffs and quotas. In the 
presence of a quota, an improvement in the terms of trade continues to be 
beneficial to a small country. This constitutes an exception to the Bhagwati’s 
(1971) generalized theory of distortions and welfare. However, if imports 
are restricted by tariffs, the welfare effect is indefinite in general. Thus, 
consistent with the theory of distortion and welfare, it is possible for an 
improvement in the terms of trade to be welfare-reducing.
*  Oregon State University, Department of Economics, Corvallis, OR (U.S.A.).
* *  Louisiana State University, Department of Economics, Baton Rouge, LA (U.S.A.), 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Operations and Systems Management, N.T., 
Hong Kong.
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2. The Setting
We use the standard two-sector trade model incorporating variable 
returns to scale (VRS) developed by Batra (1968), Herberg and Kemp 
(1969), Panagariya (1980, 1981), Choi and Yu (1985, 1987), Parai (1985) 
and Beladi (1988). The economy under consideration is small so that it is a 
price-taker in world trade. On the production side, the two sectors produce 
two goods X j and X 2 using two factors of production: capital and labor. 
Assume the economies or diseconomies are output generated; they are exter­
nal to the firms and internal to the industry.
The production functions are thus specified as follows:
Xj =  gi (X,) Fi (cit /,), * = 1 , 2  (1)
X, =  g, (Xj) Fj (Kj, Lj), i =  1 ,2  (2)
where Xj is the output of a typical firm in industry i and ct and l, are capital 
and labor by the firm. X ; is the output of industry i and Kt and Lj are its 
total employment of capital and labor. The role of externality is described 
by gj which is a positive function defined on (0, ° ° ), and jF- is homogeneous 
of degree one.
Output elasticity of returns to scale of the zth industry (et) defined on 
(— ° ° ,  1) may be written as
e, =  (dgj/dXj) (Xj/gj), i =  1, 2. (3)
Note that et >  0 for increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) industry, et =  0 for 
constant-returns-to-scale industry (CRS) and et <  0 for decreasing-returns 
to-scale (DRS) industry.
Differentiating (2) and using the conditions of profit maximization and 
full employment, we obtain the following well-known result:
d X jd X 2 =  -  [(1 -  e2)/(l -  e ^ p ,  (4)
where p is the domestic price of X2 in terms of X {. Note that the marginal 
rate of transformation is shown to be negative. If ex >  ( < )  e2, the price 
line (p ) is flatter (steeper) than the slope of the transformation curve.
The demand side of the economy is represented by an expenditure 
function defined by
E (p, u) =  min (Dx +  pD2), (5)
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with respect to the demand for the two commodities, Dx and D2, subject to 
a strictly quasi-concave utility function u {Dx, D2) >  u.
For concreteness, let good 1 be the exportable and good 2 be the 
importable goods. Let
M =  Ep (p, u) -  X2 (p ), (6)
denote the importable good, where Ep — dE (p, u)/dp =  D2. The volume 
of import, M, is endogenously determined when the economy is initially 
distorted by tariffs, whereas M is exogenously fixed when the economy is 
initially distorted by import quotas.
The budget constraint is expressed by
E (P, u) =  X x +  pX2 +  {p — p  ) M, (7)
where p* is a world price which is assumed to be less than the domestic 
price ratio, p. The term (p — p*) M is government revenue from the tariffs or 
import quotas. The revenue is assumed to be redistributed back to the 
private sectors in a lump-sum fashion so that the revenue is spent in the 
same manner as other incomes.
The above model is amenable for examining the welfare implications 
of an exogenous deterioration in the terms of trade under tariffs or import 
quotas. Taking total differentiations (7) and utilizing (6), we obtain the 
change in welfare (dW =  Eudu) as
dW =  Eudu =  dXx +  pdX2 +  (p — p*) dM -  Mdp*, (8)
where Eu =  dE/du. Note that under CRS, the first two terms on the RHS 
of (8) vanish since production equilibrium occurs when dXx +  pdX2 =  0. 
This standard result is, however, in need of revision under VRS. Using (4), 
(8) may be rewritten as
dW =  sM [(e2 -  ex)/(l -  ex)] dp +  (p -  p*) dM -  Mdp*, (9)
where s =  (p/M)(dX2/dp) is the substitution in production in response 
to a change in p. Note that assuming positive price-output response, s >  0.
We need to determine either dp in the case of import quotas or dM in 
the case of tariffs. To do so, we totally differentiate the equilibrium condi­
tion (6) as follows:
Epudu =  (e +  s)(M/p) dp +  dM, (10)
where Epu =  dEp/du, and e — — (p/M)(dEp/dp) is the consumption substitu­
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tion for a given utility. Note that since the expenditure function is homoge­
neous of degree one in goods prices, the marginal propensity to consume 
good 2 can be defined as m =  pEpJ E u. Therefore, (10) may be rewritten as
(.m/p) dW =  (e +  s){M/p) dp +  dM. (11)
Note that e >  0 and 0 <  m <  1.
By using (9) and (11), we are ready to analyze the welfare effect of a 
deterioration in the terms of trade under tariffs and import quotas.
A. Tariffs
Let t be the rate of tariff, so that the domestic price ratio for producers 
and consumers is given by p =  (1 +  t) p *. The welfare effect of a change in 
the terms of trade is then given by
dW =  sM (1 +  /) [(e2 -  ef)/(\ -  ex)] dp* +  tp dM -  Mdp* (12)
The first term on the RHS of (12) captures the divergent returns-to- 
scale effect on welfare which is positive when the importable sector has a 
larger elasticity of the returns to scale than the exportable sector. The 
second term indicates the terms of trade effect on imports and the third 
term is the direct welfare loss due to a deterioration in the terms of trade.
Prior to examining the welfare effect, we need first to obtain the 
domestic price elasticity of import demand under tariffs, which is defined 
by a =  -  (p/M)(dM/dp). By solving (11) and (12), we obtain that
a =  -  (p/M)(dM/dp) =  [e +  sa +  m /(l +  /)] T, (13)
where a  is defined as [1 — m (e2 — ex)/{ 1 — fj)] and T =  \ l  — mt/{l +  i)]-1 
is the tariff multiplier. Note that a >  0 since [1 — m (e2 — e f / i  1 — <?j)] >  
[1 — m (1 — Cj)/( 1 — e1)]. Then by substituting (13) into (12), we simplify 
(12) to
dW =  sM (1 +  t)[{e2 -  <?!)/( 1 -  ex)] dp* -  M { 1 +  at) dp*. (14)
Let us consider several cases of analytical interest. Suppose the home 
industries operate under identical returns to scale, i.e., ex — e2, with CRS as 
its special case (ex =  e2 =  0). Then (14) reduces to
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dW =  -  M (1 +  at) dp , (15)
which indicates that a deterioration in the terms of trade, dp >  0, always 
reduces welfare. This result is consistent with the traditional wisdom.
Of particular interest is the situation in which the two industries op­
erate with divergent variability in the returns to scale, i.e., ex ^  e2. 
There are two distinct cases we will examine; one of them will provide a 
paradoxical result.
Consider first the case where e1 >  e2; that is, the exportable sector 
has a larger elasticity of the returns to scale than the importable sector. A 
deterioration in the terms of trade raises the domestic relative price of 
importables. As a result, the domestic resources are induced to shift from 
the exportable (higher returns to scale) sector into the importable (lower 
returns to scale) sector. This production loss as reflected by the first term 
of (14), coupled with the direct welfare loss, necessarily reduces welfare.
Consider now the case where e2 >  ex\ that is, the importable sector 
has a larger elasticity of the returns to scale than the exportable sector. It is 
interesting to note that the terms of trade loss will generate a production 
gain, because the rise in the domestic relative price of the importables will 
cause resources to move from the exportable (lower returns to scale) sector 
into the importable (higher returns to scale) sector. The net welfare conse­
quence of the terms of trade loss clearly depends on the relative strength of 
the two opposite effects. Specifically, if (1 +  at)/(s +  st) <  (e2 — ex)/ 
(1 — ex), the production gain due to the divergent returns to scale dominates 
the direct welfare loss of the terms of trade loss, thereby resulting in a 
higher welfare. This is likely to occur when s is larger and/or a is smaller: 
the larger the value of s and/or the smaller the value of a, the more the 
response of the home production in the importable sector. Thus, the 
following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1: An exogenous deterioration in the terms of trade in the 
presence of a tariff may improve welfare, if the importable sector displays a 
larger elasticity of returns to scale than the exportable sector.
B. Import Quotas
Let us consider the welfare effect of a decline in the terms of trade 
under import quotas. If import quotas are imposed at a fixed level, then dM 
=  0. By using (9), the welfare effect is given by
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dW =  sM[(e2 -  et)/(l -  <?j)] dp -  Mdp*. (16)
The first term on the RHS of (16) represents the returns-to-scale 
effect, and the second term is the direct welfare loss due to a terms of trade 
loss.
In order to determine dW, we need to determine dp, which can be 
obtained through (11) and (16) as
dp =  -  [m/(e +  sa)\ dp* <  0. (17)
Eq. (17) states that an exogenous deterioration in the terms of trade re­
duces the domestic relative price of importables in the presence of a fixed 
import quota. This result can be explained in terms of the drop in the excess 
demand for importables as a result of the decrease in the quota revenues.
Given dp/dp* <  0, the sign of dW crucially depends on the sign of (e2 
-  ex). Consider the case where ex =  e2. Then (16) reduces to
dW =  — Mdp*, (18)
which is the traditional result and states that welfare always decreases as a 
result of a decline in the terms of trade.
Next, consider the case where e, ^  e2. The total welfare effect can be 
obtained by substituting (17) into (16) as
dW =  -  M [(<? +  s)/(e +  ra)] dp*, (19)
which is always nonpositive. It is thus interesting to note that, unlike the 
earlier case of a tariff, a deterioration in the terms of trade in the presence 
of a quota always reduces welfare. The only exception is the limiting case in 
which the exportable sector operates with sufficiently strong IRS, i.e. 
Cj —» 1 (Panagariya, 1980, p. 508). Note that if ex —> 1, then a  —> . It
follows that dW —» 0. Thus, the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 2: An exogenous deterioration in the terms of trade in the 
presence of a quota reduces welfare regardless of the sectoral returns to 
scale.
An explanation for this result is the following. In the presence of a 
quota, the returns to scale effect is not sufficiently large to offset the direct 
welfare loss due to the decline in the terms of trade. The stronger the 
returns to scale in the exportable sector, the smaller the welfare loss.
I
3. Conclusions
We have examined the welfare effect of an exogenous shift in the 
terms of trade for a small open economy. It is shown that a deterioration in 
the terms of trade in the presence of a tariff may improve welfare, if the 
importable sector displays a larger elasticity of returns to scale than the 
exportable sector. Thus, we have provided a possible alternative explanation 
as to why a decline in the terms of trade may paradoxically improve welfare 
of a small open economy.
Furthermore, we demonstrated an asymmetry between tariffs and quo­
tas. Unlike the case of a tariff, a terms of trade loss cannot lead to a higher 
welfare in the presence of a quota regardless of the sectoral returns to scale. 
Since quotas rather than tariffs have become effective constraints on imports 
frequently used by developing countries, our results have important implica­
tions for the developing countries facing chronic deterioration in the terms 
of trade.
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RESTRIZIONI COMMERCIALI, TERMS OF TRADE E BENESSERE CON 
RENDIMENTI DI SCALA VARIABILI
Questo articolo esamina gli effetti sul benessere di un cambiamento esogeno 
dei terms of trade per una piccola economia aperta. Si stabilisce una asimmetria 
tra tariffe e contingentamenti. Si mostra che un deterioramento dei terms of 
trade in presenza di una tariffa può migliorare il benessere se il settore delle 
importazioni mostra una maggiore elasticità dei rendimenti di scala del settore 
delle esportazioni. Comunque, una perdita in terms of trade non può produrre un 
maggior benessere in presenza di un contingentamento.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 38 (1991), N. 9, 833-842
NON-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE, ADJUSTMENT COSTS 
AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL NOTE
by
P eter  K ugler  *  and U rs Müller * *
1. Introduction
The article of Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) presents an interesting 
dynamic factor demand model taking into account adjustment costs for 
quasi-fixed factors under rational expectations. This model, which includes 
two quasi-fixed factors (capital and white-collar labour) and one flexible 
factor (blue-collar labour) fits well to annual US data for the period 1947* 
1969. Of course, the sample period considered is characterized by factor 
price and quantity movements, which were rather smooth compared to 
those we experienced in the 70’s and 80’s. Thus, it seems, at least to us, to 
be interesting to explore the explanatory power of the Pindyck-Rotemberg 
model with recent data. To this end, we estimated an extended version of 
the Pindyck-Rotemberg model, taking into account non-neutral technical 
change with quarterly data for five major German industries covering the 
period 1970-1984. Non-neutral technical change is included because the 
estimation of a static factor demand model (Kugler, Müller and Sheldon,
1988) as well as an ad-hoc dynamic model (Kugler, Müller and Sheldon,
1989) clearly rejected the hypothesis of neutral technical change for West 
Germany.
This paper is set up as follows: The next section presents the theoreti­
cal model. Thereafter, our empirical results are given in Section 3. The 
paper closes with a summary and some conclusions.
*  Universität Bern.
* *  Universität Basel.
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2. The Theoretical Model
Let us assume that at time t the representative firm chooses the input 
level for the flexible factor blue-collar labour Bt and the quasi-fixed factor 
white-collar labour Wt and capital Kt. The nominal price of Bt is denoted 
by bt, whereas the outlay for using one unit of Wt and Kt is given by wt and 
kt, respectively. Changes in the input level of blue-collar labour are costless, 
while white-collar labour and capital are subject to adjustment costs. One 
single output is produced with these inputs. Thus, technology can be repre­
sented by a restricted cost function for the flexible factor
Ct = f { b p Wt! Kp Qt> t). (1)
This function gives the minimal expenditures on Bt to produce Qt 
given its price and the input level of the quasi-fixed factors Wt and Kt. In 
addition, the time index t represents the effects of technical change. The 
function /  is increasing and concave in bt and decreasing and convex in Wt 
and Kr Adjustment costs for white-collar labour and capital are represented 
by the convex function c (Wt — Wt_v Kt — (1 -  d) Kt_x), where d is the 
depreciation rate for capital. The function gives adjustment costs in real 
terms. Thus, it has to be multiplied by the price of output Pt in order to get 
them in nominal terms.
Given these definitions, we assume that the firm maximizes its ex­
pected discounted value of profits. It was shown by Pindyck and Rotemberg 
(1983) that, as an implication, the expected discounted value of total costs 
is minimized. The minimand is given by
Et I  Rlr  [f(bz, Wz> Kv Qz, t ) +  wz Wz +  kx Kz +
T =  t
+  c (WT — Wz_v Kz — (1 — d) Kz_,) Pz], (2)
where Rt z is the discount factor and Et stands for conditional expectation 
given the information available at period t.
Differentiating (2) with respect to bt, Wt and Kt provides us with the 
following first order conditions:
dC,
dbt
SC, . . Sc(W, -  W,_„ K, -  (1 -  d)K ,_,)
ew, ,+ tjF' +
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+  E' Rt, i + i
dc(Wl + l -  Wt, Kt , j -  (1 -  d )K t)
dWt P. + i
K  k dc(W' -  Wt_ u Kt -  (l -  d)K t_ x) 
dKt ‘ 3Kt
+  E'
dc(Wt + l -  Wt,K t + l -  (1 -  d) Kt) n




The above condition with respect to the flexible factor follows from 
Shepard’s Lemma and is static in nature. The dynamic first order conditions 
for the quasi-fixed factors Wt and Kt, the so-called Euler equations, can be 
interpreted as follows: The second equation, for instance, says that the
decrease in variable or flexible cost of a one-unit increase in W, dCt
‘ {dW ,
is
equal to the costs of using this additional unit (wt), plus the adjustment cost
at t of the increase in Wt \ -  — P,) plus the expected discounted change
\dW t )
of future adjustment costs dct + i
dWt
p   1 p-i,w Li + 1
These first order conditions are now analysed empirically \  In order 
to do this, we have to specify functional forms for / {bt, Wt, Kt, Qt, t) and 
c(Wt -  W,_u Kt -  (1 -  d)K l_1). We specify f {b t, Wt, Kt, Qt, t) as a 
translog function which is homogeneous of degree one in bt\
ln (Ct) =  lnß  ̂ +  ln ^  =  a 0 +  Inbt +  a x InWt +  a 2 In Kt +
+  a 3 InQ, +  a 4 1 +  ^  yn (InW,)2 +  y 12 InWt InKt +
+  y 13 \nWt lnQ/ +  y 14 lnW; t +  i  y22 (lnK,)2 +  
+  r 23 lnKt lnQ/ +  r  24ln̂ 1 +  (inQd2 +  1
1 Of course, this approach does not allow to calculate factor demand functions depending 
on the time series process for the vector of prices. This would require an analytical solution of 
the stochastic control problem, which is in general an intractable task. However, there are 
numerical methods to solve this problem (Nadiri and Prucha, 1986).
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+  r 34 In Qt t +  i  r 4411- (4 )
By contrast to Pindyck and Rotemberg, who use only the linear time 
term a4 t, we allow for quadratic and cross product terms involving the 
time index. Thus, non-neutral and/or accelerating or decelerating techni­
cal progress is allowed for in our framework. The parameters a4 and y44 
represent the total effect of technical change on flexible or variable costs. If 
y44 is negative (positive), we have acceleration (deceleration) of technical 
progress. Otherwise, technical change is implemented at a constant rate 
a 4. The bias or non-neutrality of technical change is represented by the




gives the change over time in variable cost changes resulting from an addi­
tional input unit of W. Thus, if y14 >  0 ( <  0), we have Weaving (using) 
technical progress, otherwise (y14 =  0) technical change is neutral. Of 
course, y24 has the same interpretation for the second quasi-fixed factor K. 
Further insight can be obtained by imposing constant returns to scale 
(CRTS). It is easily shown by totally differentiating (4) with respect to W, 
K and Q that CRTS implies the following restrictions:
a i +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1,
r  n +  y 12 +  r i3 =  o,
y  12 +  r 22 +  y23 =  o, (5)
y 13 +  r 23 +  r 33 =  o,
714 +  r 24 +  r 34 =  0.
The last equation shows that the bias of technical change for the two 
quasi-fixed factors and y34 add up to zero. Thus, y34 represents the bias of 
technical change for the flexible factor B.
For the adjustment cost function c, we adopt the following quadratic 
specification:
t«7, -  " V i* 2 +  J f t 2 ( K  -  (1 -  K , _ , ) 2. (6)
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Given these specifications, we obtain the following first order condi­
tions. Firstly, homogeneity of degree one of C in b implies that the first 
condition of (3) always holds. Thus, testing this first order condition a- 
mounts to testing the input requirement function resulting from (4) after 
substracting \nb on both sides. Secondly, the Euler equations are written as:
w t
oq +  Yn lnW, +  y12 InK, +  y13 lnQt +  y 1 4 1 +  wt +
+  ßi l W t ~ wt- 1)  Pt ~  Et IRt w l + 1 -  w t) p, + . ]
Sll
Kt
a2 +  y 12 In Wt +  y22 ln£, +  y23 In Qt +  y24 t +  kt +
=  0,
(7)
+  ß:22 (Kt - ( l - d ) K l_ l)P t - E l [ ( l - d )
Rt (Kt + 1- ( l - d ) K t)P l + l\ 0.
3. Empirical Results
For the estimation of the model, we replace the expected values by 
actual values plus an expectational error e. This procedure yields, after 
some rearrangement, the following two equations:
_Q
w.
a 1 +  Yn In^  +  yi2 InK, +  yî3 lnß, +  y141 +
+  ßu IRt W , +  1 -  wt) PI + 1 - { W '~  Wt_ x) Pt\ +  el J  + „  (8)
kt =  - £ i
Kt L
a2 +  y a  lnW7/ +  Y 22 lnKt +  y23 InQ, +  y2 4 1 +
+  /?22 [R,( l —d) (Kl + l - ( l - d ) K t)Pl+l -  { K - { l - d ) K t_x)Pt\ +
+  e2,t + l- (9)
Under rational expectations, Et [sx t + J  =  Et [ e 2 t + J  =  0 holds. In
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addition, we will assume that the contemporaneous covariance matrix of s1 
and e2 is Î2.
There is a symmetry restriction in the system given above. The coef­
ficient of the term ^  jn tj-,e second equation is equal to the coefficient
Kt
C 1 nK
of the term ------ - in the first equation. Moreover, constant returns to
W,
scale (CRTS) result in two additional restrictions
(7n +  7 12 +  7l3 =  ». Yu +  722 +  723 =  0),
which can be imposed on (8) and (9). The additional three CRTS restric­
tions
(«! +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1, y 13 +  y23 +  y33 =  0, y 14 +  y24 +  y34 =  0),
can be used to calculate a 3, y33 and y34. Thus estimation of (8) and (9) 
under CRTS allows to estimate all parameters of the cost function with 
the exception of a 4 and y44. This corresponds, of course, to the situation in 
a static three factor translog model resulting in two value share equations 
to be estimated.
The rational expectations assumption implies that the error terms eu , j 
and e2i + j are uncorrelated with variables dated t and earlier. Therefore, 
only the adjustment cost variables have to be instrumented at the first stage 
of the estimation procedure. To this end, the variables Wt, Wt_ v Kt, Kt_ v 
Ct, Qt, Rp Pt and t were used as instruments. At the second stage, the two 
equations are estimated separately whereas the final stage takes into account 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms and, if imposed, cross equa­
tion restrictions. This three-stage least squares approach is applied a) with­
out restrictions, b) with the symmetry restriction and c) with symmetry and 
CRTS restrictions. These restrictions are tested with the corresponding asym­
ptotic Wald x2 test.
Of course, we can augment our estimation system by the input require­
ment or flexible cost function (4). In principle, this procedure results in an 
efficiency gain and allows, in addition, to estimate the parameters a4 and 
y44. However, the tremendously high intercorrelation of the right hand side 
variables of (4) in our sample of rather limited size resulted in severe 
numerical problems. Thus, this extended approach was not followed here.
Empirical implementation of the model outlined in the last section 
requires statistical information on the prices and quantities for output and 
inputs. We estimated our model using seasonally adjusted, quarterly data
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for five major industrial groupings (consumer goods, basic material, food 
and tobacco, investment goods, mining) in West German manufacturing for 
the years 1970-1984. Quarterly data were required to provide enough obser­
vations for estimation. However, with the exception of labour (blue and 
white-collar), only annual data were available for the FRG. We, thus, had to 
transform the annual figures into quarterly data. As for output, we used 
appropriate quarterly indicators in combination with an interpolation meth­
od developed by Chow and Lin (1971). In the case of capital, though, we 
were forced to resort to a simple cubic spline function to generate a quarter­
ly series. Details on the data series and their sources are available from the 
authors.
The estimation results are reported in Table 1. The parameter esti­
mates presented are restricted by the basic model assumption of symmetry. 
However, this restriction is rejected by the corresponding Wald test at the 
conventional 5%  level in three out of five industries. The additional restric­
tions implied by constant returns to scale are rejected for all five cases. 
Thus, these tests point to misspecifications of our model. This conjecture is 
confirmed by the estimates obtained for the adjustment cost coefficients ßn 
and ß22. In two out of five industries at least one of these parameters is 
statistically significantly negative. These unsatisfactory findings seem to be 
surprising, as the application of a static translog price model with non­
neutral technical change to both annual and quarterly data sets brought 
reasonable results (Kugler, Müller, Sheldon, 1988, 1989). The model used 
in these studies differs from the one currently applied in these respects. 
Firstly, adjustment costs under rational expectations are not considered. 
Secondly, capital is disaggregated into equipment and structures. Thirdly, 
the implicit treatment of energy and material inputs is different. For the 
static translog weak separability of capital and labour on the one hand, and 
energy and material on the other hand allows neglection of the latter in the 
analysis of the system of value shares for the former. However, in the 
current model we need a much stronger assumption in order to justify 
neglection of energy and material, namely that these inputs cannot be 
substituted for capital and labour. If energy and material are flexible and 
can be substituted for labour and capital, our restricted translog cost func­
tion (4) has to be augmented by corresponding energy and material price 
terms. This modification affects the Euler equation (7) even if weak 
separability holds: The Ct variable should be total flexible costs and not 
only flexible blue-collar labour costs, and the estimation model is therefore 
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This problem seems to be the obvious candidate for explaining the 
differing results, as the probable violation of the non-substitution assump­
tion should strongly affect the empirical results, as in our sample period 
dramatic changes in energy and material prices took place. Therefore, we 
estimated a four-factor model containing energy and material inputs as 
flexible factor. Unfortunately, the results obtained, which are not reported 
here, suffer from the same problem of wrongly-signed adjustment cost 
coefficients. Thus, we have to look for another misspecification explaining 
our unsatisfactory results. The stochastic specification of the model may 
offer a fourth potential reason for the pattern of results obtained: the error 
terms of the estimated Euler equations only represent expectational errors. 
The specification of the production technology is deterministic. This is a 
questionable assumption for the time period considered, which is char­
acterized by strong changes in supply conditions. By contrast, in a standard 
translog model, the error terms account, among other things, for random 
changes in .technology. The consideration of a composite error term rep­
resenting expectational errors as well as probably autocorrelated random 
changes in technology leads to a more complicated estimation problem, 
which is beyond the scope of this note. However, it may be a promising 
problem for future research.
5. Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, industrial factor demands for West Germany are ana­
lysed empirically for the period 1970-1984, using a model taking into ac­
count explicitly adjustment costs, rational expectations and non-neutrality 
of technical change. To this end, the model of Pindyck and Rotemberg 
(1983), which considers blue-collar labour as flexible and white-collar 
labour as well as capital as quasi-fixed factors, is extended to conditions of 
non-neutral technical change. Unfortunately, the estimation of this model 
results in parameter values which stand partly in strong contrast to the 
a priori restrictions derived from economic theory. The results obtained 
so far suggest that the disappointing results are to be attributed to the 
neglection of random changes in technology.
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PROGRESSO TECNICO NON NEUTRALE, COSTI DI AGGIUSTAMENTO 
E ASPETTATIVE RAZIONALI: NOTA EMPIRICA
In questo articolo, il modello dinamico di domanda di fattori di Pindyck e 
Rotemberg viene esteso a condizioni di progresso tecnico non neutrale e applica­
to ai dati dell’industria tedesca per il periodo 1970-1984. Purtroppo, dalla stima 
di questo modello derivano valori parametrici che sono in parte in netto contra­
sto con le restrizioni a priori della teoria economica. Quanto ottenuto sinora sug­
gerisce che i risultati deludenti devono essere attribuiti al non aver tenuto conto 
di cambiamenti casuali nella tecnologia.
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Le nostre opere 
portano alla 
luce energia.
Alle sempre maggiori esigenze 
del progresso, noi della Saipem 
rispondiamo con opere sempre più 
tecnologiche. Infatti, in oltre 
ventanni, abbiamo trivellato quasi 
mille pozzi a mare per estrarre 
il petrolio.
Dal primo pozzo offshore europeo 
al largo di Gela fino alla recente 
realizzazione dello Scarabeo 5, 
una piattaforma semisommergibile 
attrezzata per operare in zone 
subartiche e in condizioni 
ambientali ostili, attualmente 
in attività in acque norvegesi. 
Perché ovunque siano richieste 
intelligenza e grandi capacità 
tecnico-operative, noi della Saipem 
apportiamo la nostra esperienza 
e il nostro know-how al fine 
di accrescere e migliorare, in Italia 
e nel mondo, la qualità della vita 
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in dall’atto della sua costituzione - nel 1894 - la Banca Commerciale Italiana è stata 
testimone dell’efficienza e dell’operosità del Paese. La prima sede fu stabilita 
a Milano, quale importante centro di industrie e degli scambi fra l’Italia e 
l’Europa centrale.
Da allora con un continuo fiorire di iniziative essa ha contribuito, nelle diverse 
epoche, sia alla creazione della struttura economica italiana sia alla ripresa del 
commercio intemazionale.
Oggi, una vasta rete operativa, costituita da oltre 590 sportelli in Italia e da dò tra 
filiali dirette ed uffici di rappresentanza all’estero, le consente di essere presente 
sia nei maggiori centri economico-commerciali del nostro Paese, sia sui princi­
pali mercati finanziari del mondo.
Oltre ad offrire alla propria clientela una vasta gamma di servizi bancari e 
“ parabancari”, la Banca Commerciale Italiana garantisce anche una com­
pleta assistenza e consulenza nelle operazioni di import/export, nelle tran­
sazioni commerciali e finanziarie, nella gestione dei patrimoni mobiliari, 
nel factoring, nel leasing, nei fondi di investimento.
L’efficienza dell’istituto è assicurata dal costante impiego delle più moderne 
tecnologie. La Banca Commerciale Italiana è stata infatti una delle prime 
aziende di credito ad avvalersi di quei sistemi di meccanizzazione del lavoro bancario 
che avrebbero portato, successivamente, all’introduzione di sofisticate, apparecchiature 
elettroniche in grado di elaborare, a distanza, notevoli quantità di dati in tempo reale 
e permettere, così, rapidi trasferimenti di fondi e di notizie da una filiale all’altra dell’isti­
tuto, o con banche situate anche in Paesi diversi.
Direzione Centrale: 
Milano
p iazza della Scala, 6 
tei 02/88501
Tutto ciò le consente di offrire servizi altamente specializzati quali le procedure d’incasso 
automatizzato RI.BA e R.I.D. e il Cash Management nonché di porre a disposizione del­
la clientela impianti automatici “self Service” per lo svolgimento delle più frequenti ope-
B A N C A
CO M M ER CIALE
IT A L IA N A
Società per Azioni - Sede in Milano 
Registro Società n. 2774 
Tribunale di Milano 
Capitale Sociale L 1.050.000.000.000 
Riserva Legale L. 310.500.000.000 
Banca di Interesse Nazionale
WHAHi LA BANCA CON LA QUALE PARLARE
—
3̂  InternationalSpectator
A quarterly journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali 
Editor: Gianni Bon vici ni 
Asst. Eds: Susanna Barbatbun, Gabriele Tonne
The first Italian review of international affairs in English.
In-depth analyses of the regional and global issues of major interest 
to Italy and Europe conducted by leading Italian and foreign experts
Volume XXVI No. 3 July-September 1991
Special Issue
International Politicai Economy in a Tripolar World
Introduction
Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan
Strategie Trade Policies in a Tripolar World 
Kenneth A. Froot and David B. Yoffie
The Internal and External Opening-up of the Single Community
Market: Efficiency Gains, Adjustment Costs and New Community Instruments
Alexis Jacquemin and André Sapir
Declining American Leadership in the World Economy 
Stephen Krasner
The Emerging Role of Japan in the World Economy 
Hideo Sato
Japan's Security Policy: Political, Economic and Military Dimensions 
Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara
Annual Subscription 1991: Italy L. 56,000 
Elsewhere L. 70,000 
Student rate: Italy L. 36,000 
Elsewhere L. 45,000
Orders should be sent to:
Organizzazione R.A.B. S.r.l.
Casella Postale 30101 - 00100 Roma 47 (Italy) 
de Postale n. 78169000.
Editorial Office: Via Angelo Brunetti 9 (Palazzo Rondinini), 00186 Roma - Tel. 06/3224360 - Fax 06/3224363
IL DENARO 
HA CAMBIATO CARIA
T o p C a r d  V I S A .  L a  tro v i in  tu tti g li sp o rte lli 
d e lla  B a n c a  N a z io n a le  d e l L a v o ro .
L a  usi o v u n q u e  c 'è  il m a rc h io  V I S A .
TopCard VISA è un nuoVo modo 
di concepire il denaro.
TopCard VISA  è comprare subito e pagare 
dopo un mese, o in comode rate mensili.
Con TopCard VISA puoi sfruttare le migliori occasioni di 
acquisto e gestire al meglio il tuo bilancio familiare.
Potrai scegliere se pagare in un’unica soluzione, entro 20 
giorni dalla data dell’estratto conto e senza interessi, oppure 
in comode rate mensili al tasso di interesse effettivo più 
vantaggioso tra tutte le carte di credito.
TopCard V IS A  è 
avere fino a IO mi­
lioni di credito.
Con TopCard VISA pos­
siedi -un altro conto, 
sempre aperto: da 2 fino 
a 10 milioni di credito 
da utilizzare in ogni mo­
mento e senza formalità.
TopCard VISA è 
una vasta rete di 
assistenza.
C ’è sempre un Punto 
TopCard VISA in tutti i 440 
sportelli BNL in Italia e i 130 all’estero, dove richiedere la 
carta e ottenere informazioni, chiarimenti, consulenza e 
assistenza.
TopCard VISA è avere due carte al prezzo di 
una.
TopCard VISA ti dona un’altra TopCard VISA identica alla 
prima, così anche un tuo familiare potrà beneficiare di tutti 
i vantaggi di TopCard VISA.
E infine se smarrisci TopCard VISA, nessun problema: basta 
una semplice telefonata per bloccarne immediatamente 
l’uso.
Le vecchie banconote vanno 
in pensione: acquistare un 
regalo, viaggiare, fare la 
spesa, con TopCard VISA 
tutto diventa più facile, più 
sicuro e più vantaggioso.
Con TopCard VISA puoi ef­
fettuare acquisti presso tutti gli 
esercizi convenzionati VISA: 
sono 7.000.000 in tutto il 
mondo, di cui oltre 100.000 in 
Italia.
Inoltre, con TopCard VISA puoi 
prelevare denaro contante in più 
di 160 Paesi presso 250.000 sportelli 
bancari convenzionati VISA.
TopCard VISA: in un’unica carta, così tanti 
vantaggi.
TopCard VISA ti offre un’ampia gamma di servizi, tutti 
compresi nella quota annua di 40.000 lire:
•  TopCard Assistance, un completo servizio di assistenza 
medico-sanitaria, anche a domicilio;
•  assicurazione contro furto o rapina degli oggetti 
acquistati o del denaro prelevato con TopCard VISA;
• protezione viaggi: polizza infortuni e assicurazione per 
furto o smarrimento bagagli quando i biglietti sono 
acquistati con TopCard VISA;
• servizio Telehotel, che garantisce il mantenimento della 
prenotazione alberghiera.
T o p C a rd  VISA
TopCard VISA . Per tutte le occasioni, per 
tutte le spese, per tutti i giorni.
TopCard VISA 
richiedila subito al
Al vostro fianco in Italia e nel mondo.
Se vi avvicinate al Banco di 
Napoli, scoprirete non solo 
una grande banca, ma soprat­
tutto una grande rete di servi 
zi. Oltre 500 sportelli in Italia e 
nel mondo, e terminali intelli­
genti in grado di gestire milioni
di operazioni in tempo reale, 
ovunque voi siate. E ancora, 
una grande holding con so­
cietà che operano in tutti i set­
tori della finanza e dei servizi. 
E una presenza consolidata 
anche nell’area del credito a
medio e lungo termine, a soste­
gno dell’agricoltura, dell’edili­
zia, dell’industria, delle opere 
pubbliche e dell’esportazione. 
Perché dal 1539 la nostra voca­
zione è quella di èsservi sempre 
vicini. In Italia e nel mondo.
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